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Abstract 
The European Aviation Safety Agency has recently approved commercial operations on 
single-engine turbine aeroplanes at night and in poor weather. Growth in the operations 
in this sector can be reasonably expected. In addition to regulations applicable to all 
commercial operators, the single-engine turbine operators must fulfil various single-
engine safety related demands. For example, an emergency landing site must be 
available within gliding distance unless a risk period is utilised. Approach phase is one 
of the critical phases of the flight due to relatively low flying altitudes. It is also 
complicated to examine due to variance in actual flight routes in approach. 
 
A theoretical model for studying the risk period is developed in this thesis. The 
applicability of the method is tested with a case study. The first objectives are to find 
equations and boundary conditions required in the analysis. Then simulated flight 
profiles are constructed and the risk periods arising in the approach flight phase are 
calculated. Moreover, the geographical location of the risk areas is identified. Aim is to 
first calculate the risk periods assuming still air conditions and then study and compare 
the effect of headwind. Furthermore, possible risk mitigation methods are discussed and 
their effect to the risk periods and risk areas are examined.  
 
As an outcome, a spreadsheet computation tool was developed. The case study focused 
on Pilatus PC-12 aircraft flying approaches at Helsinki Airport. A total of 40 different 
standard instrument arrivals were studied. The analysis was highly theoretical and the 
simulated flight profiles do not precisely correspond to actual flight routes at Helsinki 
Airport. However, the results were credible and distinctive. The results indicate that the 
total risk period can vary greatly depending on the relation between the arrival direction 
and the runway in use, as well as on the altitude constraints in the instrument approach 
procedures. Headwind had a significant effect in the risk period. It decreased the 
aeroplane’s gliding capability and ground speed, thus increasing the risk area and 
exposure time. In some cases, both with and without the headwind effect, risk 
mitigation was necessary to fulfil the requirements set for the maximum duration of the 
risk period. The main mitigation means identified were utilising higher descent angle 
and speed profiles in the approach and selecting an alternative emergency landing site 
in addition to the runway in use. By utilising these means the risk period could be 
significantly reduced. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Euroopan lentoturvallisuusvirasto on äskettäin antanut hyväksyntänsä yksimoottoristen 
potkuriturbiinikoneiden kaupalliselle operoinnille yöllä ja huonon sään vallitessa. On 
siis perusteltua odottaa operaatiomäärien kasvavan tällä sektorilla. Niiden määräysten 
lisäksi, jotka koskevat kaikkia kaupallisia operaattoreita, yksimoottorisia turbiinikoneita 
käyttävien operaattoreiden on täytettävä useita yksimoottoristen lentokoneiden 
turvallisuuteen liittyvä vaatimuksia. Esimerkiksi, pakkolaskupaikka on oltava aina 
saavutettavissa liitomatkan päässä, ellei riskiperiodia hyödynnetä. Lähestyminen on 
tässä mielessä yksiä kriittisimpiä lennon vaiheita, koska silloin lennetään suhteellisen 
matalalla. Lähestyminen on myös monimutkainen tutkia, sillä todelliset lentoreitit 
vaihtelevat paljon. 
 
Tässä diplomityössä kehitetään teoreettinen malli, jolla voidaan tutkia riskiperiodeja. 
Mallin toimivuutta käytännössä testataan esimerkkitapauksen avulla. Työn ensimmäiset 
tavoitteet ovat etsiä analyysissä tarvittavat matemaattiset yhtälöt sekä määrittää raja-
arvot. Seuraavaksi rakennetaan simuloidut lentoprofiilit ja lasketaan 
lähestymisvaiheessa syntyvät riskiperiodit. Lisäksi tunnistetaan riskialueiden 
maantieteelliset sijainnit. Tarkoituksena on ensin laskea riskiperiodit tyynessä säässä 
sekä sen jälkeen tutkia ja vertailla vastatuulen vaikutusta. Lisäksi pohditaan mahdollisia 
keinoja riskien pienentämiseksi ja tutkitaan niiden vaikutuksia riskiperiodeihin ja 
riskialueisiin. 
 
Työn tuloksena kehitettiin taulukkolaskentatyökalu. Esimerkkitapaus keskittyi Pilatus 
PC-12 -lentokoneeseen ja Helsinki-Vantaan lentoaseman lähestymismenetelmiin. 
Yhteensä tarkasteltiin 40 vakiotuloreittiä. Tehty analyysi on hyvin teoreettinen ja 
simuloidut lentoprofiilit eivät vastaa tarkasti todellisia lentoreittejä Helsinki-Vantaalla. 
Saadut tulokset ovat kuitenkin selkeitä ja uskottavia. Tulokset osoittavat, että 
riskiperiodin pituus voi vaihdella suuresti riippuen tulosuunnan ja käytössä olevan 
kiitotien välisestä suhteesta sekä mittarilähestymismenetelmän korkeusrajoituksista. 
Vastatuulella oli merkittävä vaikutus riskiperiodiin. Se heikensi lentokoneen liitokykyä 
ja pienensi maanopeutta, samalla kasvattaen altistusaikaa riskialueilla. Joissain 
tapauksissa sekä ilman vastatuulen vaikutusta että sen kanssa tarvittiin keinoja 
riskiperiodin pienentämiseksi, jotta täytettiin riskiperiodin maksimipituudelle asetetut 
vaatimukset. Tärkeimmät löydetyt keinot olivat jyrkemmän liukukulman ja suuremman 
lentonopeuden käyttäminen sekä vaihtoehtoisen pakkolaskupaikan valinta käytössä 
olevan kiitotien lisäksi. Niiden avulla riskiperiodia saatiin huomattavasti pienennettyä. 
 
Avainsanat SET-IMC, yksimoottorinen, moottorihäiriö, riskiperiodi, lentoturvallisuus, 
lähestyminen 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has approved commercial single-
engine turbine (SET) operations at night and in instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC) over 10 years ago. Also, some major ICAO member countries such as USA, Canada 
and Australia have allowed these operations. There has been a lengthy debate in Europe 
since the early 1990’s whether or not the commercial SET operations fulfil the required 
safety standards but the operations had been forbidden until now.  
 
Finally, also the European aviation authorities have acknowledged the need to update the 
regulatory status as the turbine engine reliability and flight instruments have further 
developed. The rulemaking process was completed in the first quarter of 2017. This 
predicts a strong growth in operations on single-engine turbine aeroplanes. Even before the 
recent regulatory update, some European countries had granted permission for SET 
operations in IMC under exemptions from common European regulations. Therefore a 
handful of operators already exist in Europe as well. 
1.2 Need 
Despite the fact that modern turboprop engines are very reliable, a minor possibility for an 
engine failure is always present. With single-engine aircraft this means that an emergency 
landing needs to be performed. The regulations state that the operator must have an 
emergency landing site available for all phases of the flight unless a particular risk period 
is used. In this context, takeoff and approach are the most critical phases of flight due to 
relatively low flying altitudes. Of these two, the approach is often more complex to 
analyse.  
 
A standard instrument arrival route, an air traffic control vectored arrival or a combination 
of these will be flown around the airport and during this it is inevitable that there will be 
periods of time when, in the event of an engine failure, the gliding aircraft could not reach 
the destination airport. The pre-flight planning does not need to examine the arrival and 
other segments of approach phase in detail but some estimation of the duration of the risk 
period must be provided. This indicates a need for this thesis – a similar and as detailed 
study on the subject has not been previously conducted. One rough estimate for a possible 
approach phase risk period duration, used in a SET-IMC operations risk assessment, was 
about four and a half minutes (Bradley, 2007). 
 
Flight safety is the number one priority to most of the operators. Safety has indeed 
developed greatly during the history of commercial aviation. Achieving a zero accident 
rate is practically impossible and the means to further improve the current safety rate can 
sometimes be very costly. However, if the total risk can be reduced, implementing these 
means is highly recommended, especially if they can be adopted without significantly 
increasing the total cost. The minimum safety level is regulated with a great number of 
different rules by the aviation authorities. New regulations concerning SET-IMC 
operations in Europe have just recently entered into force and the operators need to fulfil 
these. Even if the local authorities would accept some other, less sophisticated estimation 
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 of the approach risk period and the minimum requirements could thus be fulfilled, common 
sense says a more detailed study would increase the safety level. 
1.3 Purpose and Method 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a simple method for SET-IMC operators to 
examine possible risk areas in approach and in particular during the arrival segment. 
Focusing on a particular case example this thesis examines the theoretical length of the 
arising risk period and by what means and how much the risk area could be reduced. 
Possible means to mitigate the risk are, for example, using steeper descent profile and 
maintaining higher speeds as well as improved coordination with the air traffic control in 
the arrival phase. One of the first objectives is to find the required equations and to develop 
calculation method suitable for the analysis. 
 
The case study is used to test the applicability of the developed method by identifying the 
risk periods and risk areas for Pilatus PC-12 NG at Helsinki Airport. All standard 
instrument arrivals for different runways are examined. For this, a descent profile must be 
simulated. By varying the variables in the simulation, the effect of different operating 
procedures on the risk period can be studied. 
1.4 Limitations 
The case study is limited to a specific aircraft model and airport combination. Thus, the 
results might not be directly applicable to other combinations. However, the method can be 
easily modified to other airports and aeroplanes. If there is a significant amount of 
obstacles or high terrain around the studied airport the method would need to be modified 
further. 
 
The method developed here is highly theoretical and would best suit the need of pre-flight 
planning and meeting the demands of a route risk analysis. It must be kept in mind that the 
flight profiles in this study are simulated. A complete standard arrival route is rarely flown 
in its entirety at Helsinki Airport. Often at some point vectors – headings and speed 
limitations – are provided by the air traffic control (ATC). These are practically impossible 
to predict in advance as, among other variables, other traffic and weather conditions affect 
significantly on the decisions made by the controller. On the other hand, the operator could 
make a cooperative request to ATC on how they wish to fly their approaches, if deemed 
necessary. Actual flight data should be utilised to obtain more realistic results for a specific 
aircraft. At the time of the writing, there were no such data available for the author. 
 
In addition, the study focuses solely on minimising the risk period and thus maximising 
safety in the engine failure situation, but does not take costs and economics into account. 
These two are somewhat contradicting aspects. Applying steeper descent profiles and 
higher speeds will most probably lead to increased fuel consumption. However, the 
modern turboprops are relatively fuel efficient and increasing safety at the cost of slight 
increase in fuel burn might be justified. The safety optimisation is further limited to only 
minimising the risk period. Incremental risks possibly yielding, for example, from the use 
of higher speeds or steeper descent profiles are not considered in this study. 
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 1.5 Structure 
To understand the scope of this thesis some key concepts are first shortly described in the 
second chapter. Third chapter opens up the broad regulatory field behind commercial 
single-engine operations. The idea is to find the most relevant parts in the context of this 
thesis. Also, relevant safety issues are addressed and some aircraft types introduced. In the 
fourth chapter, the theory and the formulas needed for the analysis are presented. A flight 
path simulation, as realistic as possible, is constructed with the help of experienced Pilatus 
pilots. 
 
The final part of this thesis is a case study where the developed method is tested with 
standard instrument arrival routes at Helsinki Airport simulated to be flown with the 
Pilatus PC-12. Different descent profiles are tested to find out where the possible 
geographical risk areas are located and how much the risk period could be affected. 
Finally, the results are presented and the applicability of the method discussed and 
summarised. 
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 2 Terms and Definitions 
2.1 Commercial Operations 
For simplification, two types of civil aeroplane operations can be identified – general 
aviation and commercial air transport (CAT). As general aviation refers to operations 
conducted privately, commercial air transport, on the contrary, is defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to include scheduled and non-scheduled 
international air transport operations for remuneration or hire (ICAO, 2010). 
 
Some of the aviation regulations are the same for both commercial and general aviation. 
However, many of the regulations are specified separately for both forms of operations. 
Naturally, when in commercial operations companies are taking money to transport 
passengers and cargo, the regulations are stricter than in private general aviation. This is 
due to, for example, high level of safety required and to keep competition between 
companies as fair as possible. The regulations concerning commercial single-engine 
turbine operations are described in more detail in the chapter 3. 
2.2 Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
There are specific weather minima defined in the aviation regulations for visibility, cloud 
ceiling and flying distance from a cloud. When the weather conditions are above these 
minima, Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevail. When the minima are not 
fulfilled, the prevailing conditions are said to be Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC). Consequently, IMC and VMC are mutually exclusive. (EASA, 2012b) 
 
In layman’s terms, flying in IMC means flying in poor weather and in cloud. When the 
IMC prevails, pilots must fly with sole reference to the aircraft’s instruments to navigate 
and to avoid obstacles. In VMC, pilots can determine the aircraft attitude primarily by the 
horizon and other outside visual cues. Also navigation is done by visual reference to the 
ground and obstacles. 
 
It is important to understand the meaning of IMC in the context of this thesis. If an engine 
failure occurs in VMC for a single-engine aeroplane, it is relatively easy for a pilot to make 
a decision about the forced landing site by looking outside and selecting the most suitable 
piece of terrain and then continue the approach and landing with visual cues. In IMC, this 
is usually not possible. The pilot must determine the aircraft’s position relative to suitable 
emergency landing site by some other means – the instruments. 
 
Generally, to fly in IMC, the flight must be conducted according to Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR). It is important not to confuse IMC with IFR – it is normal to fly under IFR when the 
prevailing meteorological conditions fulfil the criteria for VMC. In fact, most of the 
commercial operators in Europe operate with only IFR despite the weather conditions. This 
is due, for example, to have single operating procedures for all weather conditions and to 
allow continuing of the flight in case of unpredicted weather deterioration. Furthermore, 
the IFR have more safety barriers included in the regulations than in its counterpart Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR). 
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 2.3 Approach Flight Phase 
A single flight can be roughly divided in the following phases: taxi-out, takeoff, climb, 
cruise, descent, approach, landing and taxi-in. Taxonomies for different flight phases vary 
slightly depending on a source, but this general division is sufficient in the context of this 
thesis.  
 
Approach is a phase at the end of the flight before landing. During approach, aircraft is 
navigated to final track, slowed down and configured for landing including, for example, 
lowering a landing gear and extending landing flaps and slats. When flying with 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), approaches are flown according to Instrument Approach 
Procedures (IAP). An IAP may contain five separate segments: the arrival, initial, 
intermediate, final and missed approach segments. In addition, an area for circling the 
aerodrome under visual conditions is also considered. The different approach segments 
begin and end at designated fixes. However, under some circumstances certain of the 
segments may begin at specified points where no fixes are available. The approach 
segments and relative fixes are illustrated in the Figure 1 below. (ICAO, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 1. Segments of an instrument approach. (ICAO, 2006) 
 
An optimum and minimum descent angle in the final approach segment is 3.0 degrees. The 
angle may vary slightly between approaches to different runways. Nonetheless, it 
guarantees obstacle clearance requirements according to procedure design criteria. (ICAO, 
2006) Designed final approach angle is published in instrument approach charts and cannot 
be modified by pilots. Thus, in the final segment the aircraft altitude at each position is 
predetermined. Generally, the final descent angle is smaller than the best and lowest glide 
angle current SET aeroplanes can achieve without engine power. Consequently, in the final 
approach segment, the approaching aircraft is often beyond gliding distance from the 
runway in use. The only means of possibly decreasing this risk area and increasing gliding 
distance is using higher approach speeds and delaying the configuration of the aeroplane 
for the landing. Extension of flaps and landing gear will increase drag and decrease the 
gliding capability of the aeroplane. 
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 However, in the segments preceding the final approach, the pilots may affect the decent 
profile more, as the descent angle is not usually fixed. Especially in the often relatively 
long arrival segment, it may be possible to use higher descent angle than the nominal three 
degrees and to maintain high speeds. Arrival routes permit transition from the en-route 
phase, normally from an Air Traffic Services (ATS) route, to the approach phase. The 
arrival route normally ends at the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) (ICAO, 2006). As an 
example, Helsinki Airport (ICAO code: EFHK) runway 15 Standard Instrument Arrival 
(STAR) routes can be seen in the Figure 2. In general, STAR construction can vary 
significantly between airports. At some locations, for example traffic flow and noise 
abatement procedures might require flying longer periods of time below or above the 
optimal altitude. These constraints are published in the instrument charts. 
 
An IAP may be flown in IMC or VMC depending on the weather conditions. Considering 
an engine failure, IMC poses more challenges to the pilots to carry out an emergency 
landing safely. At least the final part of final approach segment is almost exclusively 
conducted in VMC, when the aircraft descents below the cloud base. Exceptions are highly 
automated and sophisticated high category precision approaches, but current SET aircraft 
on the market are not qualified for these. 
 
This thesis focuses solely on the approach flight phase. The safety during approach is 
studied as it is probably the riskiest phase for a single-engine aircraft, considering the 
possibility of an engine failure. This is due to flying relatively long periods of time in low 
altitudes from where the forced landing to destination aerodrome is not always possible. 
The arrival segment routes vary greatly depending, for example, on which runway is in use 
and from which direction the flight arrives. Taking all variables into account, the approach 
is also possibly the most complex flight phase to examine. The operators are, however, 
required to provide an estimate on the risks involved in each phase. 
 
Also the initial climb after takeoff includes low altitude flying. In general, the aeroplane 
will momentarily be on such an altitude from where a landing back to the departure 
aerodrome cannot be executed (neither landing ahead on the remaining runway nor turn 
back). But as the climb gradient with working engine is often greater than the glide 
gradient without engine power, the aeroplane will sooner or later gain enough altitude to 
always carry out an emergency landing back to the departure runway. Usually, some 1000 
feet of altitude is required to make a 180-degree turn back. Therefore, the initial climb 
phase is generally much more straightforward and easier to examine than the approach. 
This applies unless there are significant climb restrictions in the instrument departure 
procedures. 
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Figure 2. Helsinki Airport runway 15 standard arrival routes. (Finavia, 2017) 
 
2.4 Flight Safety 
Safety of the flight operations is or at least should be of top priority for each operator. The 
concept and aim of flight safety is rather obvious: to decrease the number of incidents and 
accidents. Being simple as a high level definition does not mean that it would be easy to 
manage. Achieving 100 per cent safety level is practically an impossible goal. Often, but 
not always, increasing safety level means analogously increasing costs of the safety 
management. After some point the costs start to rise exponentially compared to the 
achieved improvement in safety level. For this reason, risk management models such as 
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) where risks are lowered to a reasonable level 
without exceeding unacceptable increases in investments, are commonly used (Lee, 2006). 
One definition of aviation safety is given in ICAO’s Safety Management Manual (SMM):  
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 “While the elimination of aircraft accidents and/or serious incidents remains the ultimate 
goal, it is recognized that the aviation system cannot be completely free of hazards and 
associated risks. Human activities or human-built systems cannot be guaranteed to be 
absolutely free from operational errors and their consequences. Therefore, safety is a 
dynamic characteristic of the aviation system, whereby safety risks must be continuously 
mitigated. It is important to note that the acceptability of safety performance is often 
influenced by domestic and international norms and culture. As long as safety risks are 
kept under an appropriate level of control, a system as open and dynamic as aviation can 
still be managed to maintain the appropriate balance between production and protection.” 
(ICAO, 2013b) 
 
As the highest-level aviation regulator, ICAO has published their safety related rules and 
recommendations for the member states. Even a new annex (Annex 19 Safety 
Management) was released in 2013 to consolidate the existing SMM. The new annex 
collects common safety management elements from the existing annexes to make them 
easier to find. The purpose of the annex 19 is to support the continued evolution of a 
proactive strategy to improve safety performance (ICAO, 2013a). Together with SMM, it 
provides the framework for a comprehensive Safety Management System (SMS), a 
systematic approach to managing safety for different aviation organisations. A following 
definition is given for an SMS: 
 
“An SMS is a system to assure the safe operation of aircraft through effective management 
of safety risk. This system is designed to continuously improve safety by identifying 
hazards, collecting and analysing data and continuously assessing safety risks. The SMS 
seeks to proactively contain or mitigate risks before they result in aviation accidents and 
incidents. It is a system that is commensurate with the organization’s regulatory 
obligations and safety goals.” (ICAO, 2013b) 
 
The European aviation rule maker, European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), has 
adopted ICAO’s SMS concept in its regulations. Elements of SMS are divided in various 
regulatory texts for different organisation forms (airworthiness, flight crew training, 
operators and air traffic management). For example, the regulations concerning operators 
are included in the Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (Air Operations) and the 
related agency rules. (EASA, 2017c) 
 
These safety addressing regulations set the frames for operators to help them achieve the 
minimum acceptable level of safety. Yet, when the operators themselves put more effort in 
safety, the highest safety levels are achieved. With the help of harmonisation of regulations 
and organised safety management work, the aviation industry has been continuously able 
to decrease the number of incidents and accidents throughout the history of aviation. As an 
example, the development of fatal accidents for commercial jets can be seen from the 
Figure 3 below (Airbus, 2014). 
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Figure 3. Fatal accident rates for commercial air transport jets. (Airbus, 2014) 
 
In the spirit of current safety culture development, this thesis aims to give single-engine 
turbine Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holders one relatively simple tool for their SMS to 
identify hazards related to possible loss of thrust and manage the risks involved. 
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 3 Commercial Single-Engine Turbine Operations 
3.1 Introduction 
The nature of commercial flight operations in general depends on the aircraft used. There 
are some regulatory differences concerning, for instance, required equipment, flight 
planning and data monitoring that depend on factors such as the maximum takeoff mass 
(MTOM), certified passenger capacity, and number and type of engines. Some issues are 
not regulated by the authorities but might require insight from the operator to conduct safe 
operations. This chapter introduces the main regulations and other specialties related to 
commercial single-engine turbine operations. 
3.2 Regulations 
As in any aviation, the regulations concerning operations are multileveled and constantly 
changing. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) forms the global base for 
aviation regulations by setting standards and recommended practices (SARPs). In Europe, 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), a community agency established in 2002 under 
the European Union, is the highest level of aviation authorities. Yet, the national civil 
aviation authorities (CAA) still have some power of decision. Typically, EASA adopts 
most of the ICAO SARPs as they are, but this is not always the case. 
 
In general, commercial single-engine operations have long been approved in relatively 
good Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in daylight, but not in IMC or at night. To 
conduct feasible commercial operations, especially in weather sensitive Europe, utilization 
of IMC must be available. Otherwise, unpredictable weather conditions would inevitably 
cause too many flight cancellations. 
3.2.1 ICAO 
ICAO has accepted commercial operations of single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes at 
night and/or in IMC since 2005 when it published additional requirements for the 
operations. These requirements can be found in Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft, and the 
related appendix and guidance material. Relevant in the context of this thesis is the 
requirement that the state of the operator shall ensure the overall level of safety is on 
sufficient level provided by, for instance, the reliability of the turbine engine, the 
operator’s operating practices, flight dispatch procedures and crew training programmes. 
(ICAO, 2010)  
 
All aforementioned issues are related to the possible loss of engine power and the proactive 
actions the operator should do to minimise consequent injuries, as well as damages to the 
aircraft and third parties. Safety aspects, such as the engine reliability and pre-flight 
planning are discussed in more detail in the next subchapters. The general idea is, however, 
that a safe forced landing in the event of an engine failure or major malfunction can be 
carried out. Some exceptions are given to aeroplanes with very high engine reliability, 
additional systems and operational equipment, procedures and training requirements 
(ICAO, 2010).  
 
ICAO has also set some additional guidance on the given requirements. Operators are 
required to include all necessary information relevant to operations in their operations 
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 manuals. This covers procedures and training required for such operations, including pre-
planning and risk analysis for engine failure cases. Related to operator certification and 
validation, ICAO member states aviation authorities should ensure the adequacy of the 
operator’s procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency operations, including actions 
following engine, systems or equipment failures. The operators should address specific 
training procedures to cover engine failure and malfunction situations in different flight 
phases. They should also examine departure and arrival procedures and possible route 
limitations for operations on single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes. One example of 
route limitation is operations over water. According to ICAO’s recommendations, the 
distance that the aeroplane may be operated from a land mass suitable for a safe forced 
landing should be determined. This comes from distance an aeroplane is capable of gliding 
from the cruise altitude without engine power, assuming still air conditions. Member states 
may add some restrictions considering the type of operation and likely prevailing 
conditions, such as the sea conditions. If member states decide to allow extensions the total 
time beyond the gliding distance should not exceed 15 minutes at the aeroplane’s normal 
cruise speed. (ICAO, 2010) 
3.2.2 EASA 
EASA had not brought the ICAO SARPs related to single-engine turbine commercial 
operations at night and in IMC into effect until recently. EASA refers to associated 
regulations as CAT SET-IMC. The establishment of European SET-IMC regulations was 
completed on 1 March 2017 when the regulations entered into force, during the writing of 
this thesis. This means the European regulatory framework was misaligned with ICAO 
standards for well over a decade. It was also out of sync with some other major third ICAO 
member states, such as the United States of America, Canada and Australia who had 
already allowed SET-IMC operations (EBAA, 2016). 
 
Already in 1991 the EASA predecessor Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) started to 
consider the possibility to allow cargo and passenger carrying at night or in IMC with SET 
aircraft but were unable to present proposals acceptable to all member states (EBAA, 
2016). There was a long controversy on the required safety standards. During the recent 
years, European countries woke up to realise that modern turbine engines and aircraft 
instruments have become very reliable making SET operation safer than it used to be. 
Some studies suggest that such operations might be even safer than similar operations with 
older twin-engine aeroplanes (JAA, 2004). In addition, SET operations will open up 
economic possibilities for new low-density routes, not forgetting the environmental 
benefits coming from lower fuel consumption of modern single-engine turboprops (EBAA, 
2016). 
 
In 2013 EASA announced a new rulemaking task RMT.0232 & RMT.0233 which aimed to 
develop rules to allow commercial SET-IMC operations. The process went through a 
formal rulemaking steps: Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) was published in 2014 
and the related Comment Response Document (CDR) late 2015 with 157 comments from 
interested parties, including EU competent authorities, aircraft manufacturers, air 
operators, and different associations (EASA 2015b). Based on the comments and 
responses, also an Opinion No 06/2015 was developed and published in order to assist the 
European Commission in its preparation of proposals for amended regulations (EASA, 
2015a). Above mentioned rulemaking documents are based on NPA (NPA OPS 29 Rev 2) 
published in 2004 by JAA but not accepted by all EU member states at the time, an 
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 independent study on the risks of SET-IMC operations and possible mitigating factors by 
QinetiQ (Bradley, 2007) and the ICAO Annex 6. According to the opinion No 06/2015, the 
publication of the final decision, with some changes to the proposed amendments, was 
initially planned to the third quarter of 2016 but was eventually delayed by a few months. 
 
The regulations concerning all commercial air transport (CAT) operations can be found 
from Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 Annex IV (Part-CAT), Annex III (Part-
ORO - Organisation Requirements for Air Operations) and Annex V (Part-SPA - 
Operations requiring Specific Approvals). This initial regulation has since been amended 
several times. The amending regulation that brought CAT SET-IMC into force was 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/363. It introduced a new Subpart L for Annex V 
(EASA, 2017b). Some of the SET-IMC regulations relevant in the context of this thesis are 
introduced below. 
 
The EASA regulations state that single-engine aeroplanes shall not be operated at night or 
in IMC unless the operator is given a specific approval by a competent authority. 
(CAT.POL.A.300). Also EASA requires operations on routes where a safe forced landing 
can be executed, unless the operator makes use of a particular risk period 
(CAT.OP.MPA.136 and CAT.POL.A.320). If the competent authority has not otherwise 
specified, the aeroplane should be capable of reaching a point 1000 feet above the 
preselected landing area (AMC1 CAT.POL.A.320). Additionally, when verifying the 
ability to reach a suitable place for a forced landing, the aeroplane’s best glide gradient 
must be increased by a gradient of 0.5 % to add safety margin in flight planning 
(CAT.POL.A.320). These requirements are given for the en-route phase. (EASA, 2017a) 
 
The competent CAAs are required to assess the operator’s safety performance. The 
operator’s capability to appropriately manage any unexpected event which could endanger 
the safety of their operations should be continuously monitored. (AMC3 ARO.OPS.200) 
This thesis aims to improve any operator’s safety performance by preparing for the power 
loss at a critical phase of the flight. 
 
The general requirements for the aeroplane equipment, engine reliability, crew training, 
flight planning and contingency procedures are somewhat in accordance with ICAO Annex 
6. However, EASA has given more detailed guidelines for these in the related Acceptable 
Means of Compliance (AMC) texts. The AMC standards for the flight planning defining 
the use of the risk period are important. AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) gives the 
following means to comply with the related rule: 
  
(a) “The operator should establish flight planning procedures to ensure that the routes 
and cruising altitudes are selected so as to have a landing site within gliding range. 
 
(b) Notwithstanding (a) above, whenever a landing site is not within gliding range, 
one or more risk periods may be used for the following operations:  
(1) over water; 
(2) over hostile environment; or 
(3) over congested areas.  
 
Except for the take-off and landing phase, the operator should ensure that 
when a risk period is planned, there is a possibility to glide to a non-congested 
area. 
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The total duration of the risk period per flight should not exceed 15 min 
unless the operator has established, based on a risk assessment carried out for 
the route concerned, that the cumulative risk of fatal accident due to an engine 
failure for this flight remains at an acceptable level (see GM2 SPA.SET-
IMC.105(d)(2)).” 
 
Thus, the total duration of the risk period can be a maximum of 15 minutes unless a 
separate risk assessment for a specific route is conducted. In the landing (and approach) 
phase it is not required to reach a non-congested area. However, common sense says it 
would be desired to the extent possible. Furthermore, for the arrival phase AMC2 
SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) gives a recommendation the operators should only use, to the 
extent possible, arrival procedures that guarantee flight path which would allow the 
aeroplane to land on a pre-determined landing site, in case of a loss of thrust. Also, AMC1 
SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(4) states that when the risk period is used for the landing phase, the 
contingency procedures after an engine failure should include information for the pilots on 
the path to be followed. (EASA, 2017a) For these purposes, the operators would need to 
examine the arrival routes and identify possible risk areas.  
 
GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) gives an example of a safety risk assessment for a specific 
route. With the help of this assessment the operator might be able to extend the duration of 
the risk period. The methodology is to divide the route in different segments, arrival being 
one of them. The risk profile is an estimate of the probability of an unsuccessful forced 
landing if the engine fails during one of the identified segments. The most important 
variable, when assessing the risk for a segment, is the total energy (potential and kinetic) of 
the aeroplane and the position relative to an emergency landing site. Other variables are, 
for example, weather conditions, aerodrome lighting, aircraft equipment and the operator’s 
standard procedures for an emergency landing. When the probability of an unsuccessful 
landing in a segment, assumed engine failure rate and segment exposure time are known, 
the segment risk factor can be calculated. (EASA, 2017a) With thorough preparation, the 
probability of an unsuccessful emergency landing can be decreased. Furthermore, by using 
high speeds the critical segment’s exposure times can be somewhat reduced. 
3.2.3 National Regulations in Europe 
During the past years the regulatory foundation of civil aviation in Europe has gone 
through a constant change. Regulations have been harmonised by EASA. National civil 
aviation authorities (CAA) in Europe have a duty to supervise regulations set by EASA are 
complied with in that country. In addition, some regulations are left by EASA for national 
authorities to decide. Usually then national authorities are obligated to inform EASA about 
the decisions made. Moreover, there are still some forms of civil aviation where the 
regulatory harmonisation is yet uncompleted and are not regulated by common European 
rules. In many areas the process is advancing but until then, national CAA’s are 
responsible of the rulemaking and compliance. 
 
Some EASA countries, like Finland and France, had approved commercial SET-IMC 
operations even before the common acceptance, based on a derogation given in the Article 
6 of the original Commission Regulation No 965/2012. It stated that member countries are 
allowed to grant an exemption to CAT.POL.A.300(a) but shall notify the Commission 
before the change is implemented (EASA, 2012a). There was an uneven playing field issue 
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 as some operators were allowed to operate SET aircraft in IMC but others located in 
different countries were not. The recent changes to European aviation regulations corrected 
these grievances. Now these granted exemptions are valid until 2 September 2017 (EASA, 
2017a). After this date the exiting operators must have an approval in accordance with the 
new CAT SET-IMC regulations if they wish to continue their operations. 
3.3 Safety Aspects 
3.3.1 Engine Reliability 
It is desired that the power plant reliability is on a very high level so as to minimise the risk 
of a forced landing following a loss of thrust. The aircraft turbine engine reliability has 
indeed developed significantly over the years. However, there is always a possibility for a 
failure of the engine or related systems. The aviation regulators have defined a minimum 
target levels for the acceptable loss of power rate. The engine types in question should 
have accumulated sufficient experience in service for the data to be reliable. Also, some 
requirements have been set considering engine related systems that would either help 
preventing a failure or increase redundancy in case of a failure. 
 
ICAO defines power loss as any loss of power independent of whether the cause is a faulty 
engine or engine component design or installation, including engine control systems and 
the fuel ancillary. For a turbine engine to be approved for commercial IMC operations, it is 
required to have shown a power loss rate of less than 1 per 100 000 engine hours. To help 
achieve this, the engine must be equipped with a trend monitoring system, an automatically 
activated ignition system, magnetic particle detection for the engine and gearboxes, and for 
the case of failure of the fuel control unit there must be an emergency engine power control 
device. The engine trend monitoring is the operator’s responsibility and should include an 
oil consumption monitoring and engine condition monitoring. According to ICAO’s 
guidance, the data used in reliability analysis should be derived from commercial 
operations and supplemented with data from similar private operations. The minimum 
service experience is deemed to be 20 000 hours on particular aeroplane-engine 
combination. Alternatively, data from sufficiently similar engine variants can be utilised or 
the minimum hours decreased with some additional testing. When making the reliability 
assessment, statistical estimates derived from world fleet database may be used. (ICAO, 
2010) 
 
The fundament of the new EASA’s regulations for commercial operations is to allow 
operations on aeroplanes meeting specified power plant reliability and equipment 
requirements (EASA, 2015a). The CAT SET-IMC regulations use the same 1 per 100 000 
flight hours maximum power loss rate as ICAO. To demonstrate the required level of 
reliability, the in-service experience of the airframe-engine combination in question should 
be at least 100 000 hours – significantly exceeding the ICAO’s recommendation. EASA 
too approves supplementary means, such as testing and analysis, to demonstrate that the 
reliability criteria are met if the required experience has not been accumulated. When the 
operations are established, the operators are required to report power loss occurrences to 
the authorities who should then make an assessment of the operator’s capability to achieve 
and maintain an acceptable level of propulsion system reliability. (EASA, 2017a) 
 
The requirements related to engine reliability were overall very similar already in JAA 
proposals (NPA OPS 29 Rev 2) in 2004. The propulsion system in-flight shutdown or loss 
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 of power rate of less than 10 per 106 hours was derived and with many other fundamental 
requirements it has then been adopted to the EASA regulatory base. A thorough study was 
performed on the associated risks and compared also to operations on comparable light 
twin-engine aeroplanes. The conducted meta-analysis showed that the loss of power rate 
for single-engine turboprops in commercial and appropriate government operations in 
western countries between 1991 and 2002 was 1.38 per 106 hours. Thus the existing 
airframe-engine combinations included in the JAA’s study (Cessna 208, Pilatus PC-12 and 
Socata TBM-700) seem to fulfil the ICAO/EASA target. (JAA, 2004) If the target of 10 
per 106 hours is used in risk analysis it can be considered conservative. This is desirable 
taking into account a low statistical confidence of the meta-analysis yielding from 
relatively narrow database representing the commercial operations on single-engine 
turboprops. Many of the figures are based on estimates and may have errors of tens of per 
cents. Furthermore, the JAA study leaves out private operations that make a significant 
part of SET operations.  
 
Another estimate on the Pilatus PC-12 turboprop engine PT6A reliability is commonly 
accepted shut down rate of around 2.7 per 106 hours (Simpson, 2016). This is still well 
below the regulatory target rate. However, one more reliability survey of UK registered 
twin-engine turbine aircraft below 5700 kg and powered by the PT6 engines indicated a 
failure rate of 43 per 106 hours, for the period from 2000 to 2004 (Bradley, 2007). This is 
about four times greater than the target set for the SET-IMC operations. Although the 
study period was relatively short and included also general aviation, a clear explanation for 
the discrepancy compared to other studies on the same topic was not found.  
3.3.2 Emergency Landing Sites 
The success of a forced landing depends on the aircraft’s total energy at the point of an 
engine failure and position with relation to a sufficient landing area. The area should be 
free of obstacles with the surface allowing a safe landing run. Moreover, the success is 
affected by the cues available for the flight crew to navigate to the landing field and to 
execute the manoeuvres required for a safe power off landing. (Bradley, 2007) 
 
According to ICAO, the operator must “identify aerodromes or safe forced landing areas 
available for use in the event of engine failure” in the flight planning. All relevant 
information shall be taken into account when evaluating intended routes. For example, it is 
important to consider the nature of the terrain to be overflown. The terrain should enable 
carrying out a safe forced landing. ICAO’s definition for a safe forced landing area is that 
“it can reasonably be expected that it will not lead to serious injury or loss of life, even 
though the aeroplane may incur extensive damage”. An exemption is given for aeroplanes 
with high engine reliability, trend monitoring systems and equipment – a forced landing 
area does not need to be available at all points along a route. (ICAO, 2010) Basically this 
means utilisation of a pre-determined risk period of which maximum duration is specified 
by the competent aviation authorities. However, the aircraft systems must always “include 
a certified area navigation system capable of being programmed with the positions of 
aerodromes and safe forced landing areas, and providing instantly available track and 
distance information to those locations” (ICAO, 2010). 
 
EASA regulations concerning the emergency landing site availability were already briefly 
discussed in the subchapter 3.2.2. Here the focus is more on expected landing site 
characteristics. Accepted landing site is defined in AMC3 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2): 
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“A landing site is an aerodrome or an area where a safe forced landing can be 
performed by day or by night, taking into account the expected weather conditions at 
the time of the foreseen landing.” 
 
The operators are required to develop a system for the assessment of each new route. They 
must select aerodromes suitable for landing along the route. When evaluating the 
applicability of the landing site it is recommended to consider at least size and shape of the 
landing area, longitudinal and lateral slope, obstacles and type of ground surface. The 
outcome should be that a safe forced landing can be reasonably expected without injuries 
to people on board the aeroplane or on ground. Suitable landing sites should be readily 
programmed into the navigation system in such a way that distance and course to the sites 
are immediately available. For the arrival segment the operator should use, to extent 
possible, the arrival procedures that enable the aeroplane to land on a safe forced landing 
area. (EASA, 2017a) 
 
In the approach phase the most natural selection for an emergency landing site is the 
destination airport. When flying STARs or being vectored around the airport to align the 
aircraft for the final approach, it is not always possible to be within gliding distance from 
the landing runway. For these situations the operator can either use the risk period or 
determine another emergency landing site.  
3.3.3 Fatal Accident Rate 
The concept of accepted fatal accident rate can be compared to previously mentioned 
ALARP model. A small probability for the engine failure always exists and sometimes the 
following emergency landing can be fatal. Therefore, an acceptable level for these 
accidents must be determined. Fatalities can furthermore result from other root causes than 
engine failure. But in the context of this thesis, only the fatal accident rate following an 
engine failure is relevant. 
 
EASA’s safety target for an overall fatal accident rate in the SET-IMC operations 
including all causes is less than 4 per 106 flight hours. Based on accident databases, it can 
be considered the propulsion system failure does not contribute by more than 33 % to the 
total fatal accident rate. Thus, EASA target is that the probability for a fatal accident 
following an engine failure remains below 1.3 per 10-6 for each flight. This figure forms 
the basis for operator’s safety risk assessment for the flown routes. (EASA, 2017a) 
 
According to a statistical study conducted by JAA in the beginning of the millennium the 
fatal accident rate in commercial operations due to power loss was 0 per million flight 
hours. This study had disregarded one fatal power loss accident in 1985 which was caused 
by taking off with both fuel selectors off. Reasoning was the event occurring before the 
examined time period (1991 – 2002) and that the same result would have been expected 
also for a twin-engine aircraft. The overall fatal accident rate in the same study is 4.79 per 
106 hours. Most of the accidents have happened to Cessna 208 Caravan and none to Pilatus 
PC-12. (JAA, 2004) Once again, the statistics should be reviewed critically as the sample 
size for commercial SET-IMC operations is rather low. 
 
A more recent study on power loss accident cases for turboprops have been published in 
2013 by Robert E. Breiling Associates. It covers the accidents occurred amidst U.S. and 
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 Canadian registered fleets from the aircraft introduction until 2012. (Robert E. Breiling 
Associates, 2013) Summary of the key figures relevant for this thesis have been extracted 
to Table 1 below. The studies indicate that the respective EASA safety targets can be 
fulfilled and allowing commercial SET-IMC operations is justified. 
 
A critical factor affecting the fatal accident rate is the probability of a successful forced 
landing. According to a study 88 per cent of emergency landings, both day and night, for 
single-engine turboprops are non-fatal (JAA, 2004). Indeed, if the engine failure occurs on 
relatively high altitude on cruise phase giving the pilots enough time to find a suitable 
landing area and prepare for the landing the chances are rather good. If the failure occurs 
on low altitude and/or above unsuitable terrain (for example built-up or mountainous areas) 
the probability for a successful emergency landing decreases. Also the prevailing weather 
conditions, especially visibility and cloud base are contributing factors. 
Table 1. SET aeroplane accident data for U.S. and Canadian registered fleets. (Robert E. Breiling Associates, 
2013) 
 Cessna 208 TBM-700/ TBM-850 PC-12 PA-46-500TP 
Fleet size  
(by year end 2012) 878 422 794 363 
Hours flown 8 445 005 734 072 2 958 834 575 456 
Accidents due power 
loss / mechanical 
malfunction / failure 
20 2 4 2 
Power loss accident rate 
per 106 flight hours 2.4 2.7 1.4 3.5 
Power loss fatal 
accident rate per 106 
flight hours 
0.12 0 0 0 
All fatal accidents per 
106 flight hours 6.5 16.3 3 19.1 
 
As previously mentioned, during approach phase the aeroplane is flying on a lower altitude 
and often the number of suitable landing sites are furthermore decreased by man-made 
buildings and infrastructure around the destination airport. Moreover, flying over densely 
populated areas includes higher risk for third parties. Fortunately, STARs tend to be 
coincident with minimum noise routes, avoiding densely built-up areas. On arrival 
segment, whether on a STAR or ATC vectors, pre-determined emergency landing spots 
programmed into the aircraft navigation system could improve the probability for a 
successful landing, thus reducing the fatal accident rate following an engine failure. 
3.4 Aircrafts for SET Operations 
The number of single-engine turbine (SET) aircraft models suitable for commercial air 
transportation is currently quite limited. Some of the most common models on the market 
are Pilatus PC-12, Socata TBM, Cessna 208 Caravan and Piper PA-46-500TP Malibu 
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 Meridian. For example, at the time of the writing there is one operator in Finland, Hendell 
Aviation, operating with Pilatus PC-12 (Hendell Aviation, 2017). In addition, French 
operator Voldirect uses PC-12 and TBM 850 (Voldirect, 2017) and Swedish Nordflyg Air 
Logistics transports cargo with Cessna 208B Caravan (Nordflyg Air Logistics, 2017). 
Outside Europe there are several operators using varying SET aircraft fleets.  
 
Some manufacturers are aiming for the growing SET market and developing new models 
to compete with the existing ones. For example, Textron Aviation has recently revealed 
plans to develop a single-engine turboprop for eight passengers (Bergqvist, 2016). In the 
perspective of the case study in this thesis, the focus will be on Pilatus PC-12/47E as 
already one operator in Finland operates with this make and model introduced in more 
detail below. 
3.4.1 Pilatus PC-12/47E 
The Pilatus PC-12/47E (Figure 4) is the most recent commercial variant of a Swiss made 
single-engine turboprop aircraft Pilatus PC-12. It is also known as PC-12 NG (Next 
Generation). The aircraft is powered with 1200 hp Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67P 
turboprop engine. It is certified for 9 passengers plus two pilots and the maximum takeoff 
mass (MTOM) is 4740 kg.  
 
 
Figure 4. Pilatus PC-12/47E three view and dimensions. (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016) 
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 The PC-12/47E has a pressurised cabin and it can climb to a maximum operating altitude 
of 30 000 ft and cruise with maximum operating speed of 240 kt indicated airspeed (IAS) 
or Mach 0.48. The maximum reachable cruise speed in true airspeed (TAS) is 285 kt (= 
528 km/h) and the maximum calculated range is 1845 nautical miles (NM) (= 3417 km). A 
theoretical glide ratio 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 with feathered propeller blades is close to 16:1 (exact value 
15.798:1), meaning the PC-12 can glide approximately 78 NM from the maximum 
operating altitude of 30 000 ft down to sea level in still air. The glide time in this case can 
be over 30 minutes. The glide ratio is an important factor when planning commercial SET-
IMC flights and studying possible risk period. 
 
As opposed to older PC-12 variants, the 47E is equipped with sophisticated Honeywell 
Primus Apex integrated avionics system. It comprises a full glass cockpit – there are no 
traditional analog instruments but only electronic displays for presenting flight instruments 
and navigation information to pilots. The Pilatus PC-12 NG can be furthermore equipped 
with an optional Primus Apex Smartview synthetic vision system. It provides the flight 
crew an excellent aid for navigation and avoiding obstacles, for example, in the case of an 
engine failure in IMC. The Smartview is not approved to be used as sole reference for 
navigation. But as the displayed synthetic 3D scenery of the outside world is similar to 
what the pilots would see through the windshield during daylight in good weather 
conditions, it decreases the pilot workload significantly in emergency situations. An 
example of the PC-12 primary flight display view with the synthetic vision system is given 
in the Figure 5 below. (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016) 
 
Figure 5. Smartwiev synthetic vision system on the Pilatus PC-12. (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016) 
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 4 Theory for the Analysis 
4.1 Gliding Flight Mechanics 
When the engine fails completely in a single-engine aircraft it practically becomes a glider. 
Reaching the maximum gliding capability requires feathering the propeller that is turning 
the propeller blades parallel to the airflow. Otherwise the windmilling propeller would 
cause excessive drag increasing the glide angle. This study assumes the propeller 
feathering system is operative. A partial power loss is also possible. In that case, the engine 
is capable of producing some thrust, possible consequent still being an emergency landing 
but with smaller gliding angle. A total and immediate power loss is assumed in this thesis, 
meaning that thrust is set to zero instantly when the engine failure occurs. 
 
A stationary gliding flight with a relatively shallow glide angle or flight path angle 𝛾 is 
assumed. Thus it can be estimated that cos 𝛾 ≈ 1 and sin 𝛾 ≈ 0 (with 𝛾 in radians). 
Furthermore, the glide angle in steady wind can be extracted from the following equation: 
(Hoffren and Rahikainen, 1992) 
 
 
𝛾 = − 1
𝐸
 (1) 
 
where 𝐸 is the glide ratio of the aircraft. The Equation 1 yields a negative value for flight 
path angle 𝛾 (downwards) but for this thesis the glide angle is defined to be always positive 
and the minus sign is discarded. Furthermore, the glide ratio can be calculated with the 
equation below: 
 
 
𝐸 = 𝑅
∆ℎ
 (2) 
 
where 𝑅 is the glide range and ∆ℎ the change in altitude. The relation between the altitude, 
glide range, glide ratio and glide angle can also be seen geometrically from the Figure 6. 
The glide ratio 𝐸 and glide angle 𝛾 are independent of the aircraft weight and air density. 
(Hoffren and Rahikainen, 1992)  
 
 
Figure 6. The gliding flight. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Pilatus PC-12 can glide approximately 78 NM 
from the altitude of 30 000 ft. Thus, the best glide ratio 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥 for this aircraft is 15.798 and 
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 calculated with the Equation 1, the minimum theoretical glide angle  𝛾𝑚𝑖𝑛 is 3.67°. It is 
not, however, meaningful to use the best theoretical values for the analysis as many 
factors, such as piloting accuracy and degrading of the aerodynamic efficiency, de facto 
decrease the gliding capability. The EASA required flight planning safety margin 
increment of 0.5 % for the best glide gradient is applied and the value rounded up. Thus 
the calculations in the analysis are made with 𝛾𝑚𝑖𝑛 of 3.95°. Moreover, the effect of wind 
is discussed separately in the next subchapter 4.1.1. 
 
In steady state gliding flight the indicated airspeed 𝑉 is practically constant. To reach the 
maximum glide distance in still air, the glide must be flown with minimum drag airspeed 
𝑉𝑚𝑑 (Hoffren and Rahikainen, 1992). The minimum drag or best glide speed depends on 
the aeroplane current weight. The given values for Pilatus PC-12 vary between 93 kt and 
119 kt (IAS) for weights at range 2900 – 4740 kg (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016). The speed that 
an operator will use in case of engine failure might also depend on the operator’s standard 
operating procedures (SOP). In the approach phase, it is not reasonable to use the 𝑉𝑚𝑑 
given for the maximum mass as the aircraft never weights this much after burning fuel in 
the previous flight phases. For simplicity, a fixed value of 𝑉𝑚𝑑= 116 kt, corresponding to 
aeroplane mass of 4500 kg is used in this study.  
 
If the aircraft has excess speed compared to 𝑉𝑚𝑑 when the engine fails, the kinetic energy 
can partially be transformed into potential energy. This transformation cannot, of course, 
be done without energy losses. Lacking a better knowledge and taking human factors 
(reaction time and piloting skills) into account, an estimate that 50 % of the excess speed 
can be converted to altitude is applied in this research. The conversion is calculated with 
the revised total energy equation below. 
 
 
∆ℎ𝑉 = 0.5 ∙ (𝑉 − 𝑉𝑚𝑑)22𝑔  (3) 
 
where ∆ℎ𝑉 is the change in the aeroplane’s altitude, 𝑉 the indicated speed at the moment 
when the engine fails and 𝑔 the constant gravitational acceleration of 9,81 m/s2. It is 
assumed that the speed is transformed into height instantly at the engine failure, increasing 
the equivalent altitude ℎ𝑒𝑞 at the beginning of the glide. 
 
One glide performance related factor that must be taken into account is the turns needed to 
align the aeroplane to the landing runway heading. Altitude is lost during these turns. A 
standard “rate one turn” often used in instrument flying is accomplished at a heading 
change of 3° per second resulting a full 360-degree turn in two minutes. At altitudes below 
10 000 feet, the Pilatus PC-12 weighing 4500 kg loses 5000 feet in approximately 6 to 7 
minutes in glide, depending on the air temperature (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016). This means that 
the vertical speed would be around 800 feet per minute. Thus the Pilatus PC-12 loses 
approximately 1600 feet during a 360-degree rate one turn during the glide. For a lighter 
PC-12 the rate would be less. According to practical experience, the PC-12 can make a 
360-turn even within 1000 feet lost altitude if a steeper bank (30°) than what is required for 
a rate one turn is applied (Keltanen, 2017). To be conservative, the calculated value of 
1600 ft/min is used in this study. 
 
A current heading between each STAR waypoint can be seen in the instrument charts in 
the Appendix 1. This heading is first compared to the heading required to reach an 
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 emergency landing key point (the concept of the key point is explained later in this 
chapter). Then, a final turn from the key point heading to the runway heading is calculated. 
Adding together these two heading changes gives the total amount of required turns. The 
altitude lost during the turns ∆ℎ𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 can be calculated and the result is subtracted from the 
equivalent altitude ℎ𝑒𝑞 at each point. The equivalent altitude is consequently: 
 
 ℎ𝑒𝑞 = ℎ + ∆ℎ𝑉 − ∆ℎ𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (4) 
4.1.1 Effect of Wind 
The wind is practically never completely calm. Wind conditions vary greatly and are 
difficult to take into account accurately. Thus it is often general regulatory practice to 
assume still air conditions. For example, ICAO Annex 6 guidance for SET-IMC operations 
over water states: “The distance that the aeroplane may be operated from a land mass 
suitable for a safe forced landing should be determined. This equates to the glide distance 
from the cruise altitude to the safe forced landing area following engine failure, assuming 
still air conditions” (ICAO, 2010).  
 
However, EASA’s regulatory material stipulates that when operators are assessing a new 
route they should evaluate specific weather conditions that might affect the capability of 
the aeroplane to reach the selected forced landing area (AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2)). 
The likely ambient conditions (cloud ceiling, visibility, wind and light) should be taken 
into account in the safety risk assessment for each flight segment (GM2 SPA.SET-
IMC.105(d)(2)) (EASA, 2017a). Furthermore, it is worth noting that the selection of the 
runway in use is usually done so that the landings are performed into headwind. The 
headwind has a negative effect on the glide performance as it increases the actual 
minimum glide angle. Therefore it is reasonable to also study the effect of wind to the risk 
period. As an example, the effect of a constant 20 kt headwind for the PC-12 gliding flight 
is next examined. 
 
The Equations 1 and 2 can also be written in a form: 
 
 
𝛾 = ℎ̇
?̇?
= ℎ̇ 𝑉𝐺𝑆 (5) 
 
where ℎ̇ is vertical speed and 𝑉𝐺𝑆 ground speed. Applying the Equation 5 above, the Pilatus 
PC-12 vertical speed can also be analysed numerically. In zero wind and at low altitude, 
the ground speed is practically the same as indicated best glide speed 𝑉𝑚𝑑 = 116 kt = 59.68 
m/s. Inserting the known 𝛾𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 3.95° in radians, we get: 
 
 
ℎ̇ = 0.06894 rad ∙ 59.68 ms ≈ 4.114 ms ≈ 810 ftmin (6) 
 
which confirms the value extracted from the aeroplane flight manual. Next the Equation 5 
is applied again keeping the vertical speed same but with 20 kt smaller ground speed, 
giving the glide angle with wind effect 𝛾𝑤. 
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𝛾𝑤 = 4.114 ms49.39 m
s
≈ 0.083296 rad ≈ 4.77° (7) 
 
It can be seen that, in this case, the 20 kt constant headwind increases the minimum glide 
angle with about 0.82 degrees. Again, this value is rounded up and the glide angle 𝛾𝑤 of 
4.8 degrees is used in this study when examining how a headwind affects the risk periods 
and areas in approach. The effect of wind to power off glide angle is illustrated in the 
Figure 7 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The effect of wind to glide angle and distance. 
 
The equation for estimating the wind effect at low altitudes in general can also be 
expressed as: 
 
 
𝛾𝑤 = 𝛾𝑉𝑚𝑑𝑉𝑚𝑑 + 𝑣𝑤 (8) 
 
where 𝑣𝑤 is the wind speed (headwind/tailwind component), headwind being a negative 
value. 
 
The indicated best glide speed is independent of altitude. Yet, the true airspeed (TAS) and 
ground speed increase when the air density decreases with altitude. This results also in a 
higher vertical speed during the glide. Utilising the Equations 5 – 7, it can be easily seen 
that with higher ground speed and vertical speed the negative effect to the minimum glide 
angle is smaller. Thus, using the same sea level value of 𝛾𝑤 for all altitudes gives 
conservative results. Furthermore, the negative effect of headwind could actually be 
compensated by slightly increasing the gliding speed, but here the same constant value for 
the glide speed is assumed for all cases. 
4.2 Coordinate Calculation 
4.2.1 Distance between Coordinates 
Coordinates needed for this analysis – runway thresholds and standard instrument arrival 
route points – can be extracted from the Finnish Aeronautical Information Publication 
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 (AIP) (Finavia, 2017).  A spherical law of cosines is used for calculating the distances 
between different coordinates (Williams, 2017): 
 
 𝑑 = arccos( sin𝜑1 ∙ sin𝜑2 + cos𝜑1 ∙ cos𝜑2 ∙ cos(𝜆2 −𝜆1)) ∙ 𝑟 (9) 
 
where 𝑑 is the distance, 𝜑 is latitude and 𝜆 is longitude of the two coordinates (in radians) 
and 𝑟 is Earth’s mean radius of 6371 kilometres. The formula 9 gives accurate enough 
distances for the purpose of this thesis. Some of the STAR coordinates given with an 
accuracy of fractions of an arc second are rounded to the closest full arc second. Resulting 
error magnitude is only a few metres at maximum and thus acceptable. 
4.2.2 Intermediate Points between Coordinates 
The published STAR waypoints are not themself sufficient for the analysis. Intermediate 
points (𝜑𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) at fractions between each two waypoint must be determined. For this 
purpose, the following Equations 10 – 16 can be utilised: 
 
 
𝑎 =  sin((1 − 𝑓) ⋅ 𝛿) sin 𝛿  (10) 
 
 
𝑏 =  sin(𝑓 ⋅ 𝛿) sin 𝛿  (11) 
 
 𝑥 = 𝑎 ⋅ cos𝜑1 ⋅ cos 𝜆1 + 𝑏 ⋅ cos𝜑2 ⋅ cos 𝜆2 (12) 
 
 𝑦 = 𝑎 ⋅ cos𝜑1 ⋅ sin 𝜆1 + 𝑏 ⋅ cos𝜑2 ⋅ sin 𝜆2 (13) 
 
 𝑧 = 𝑎 ⋅ sin𝜑1 + 𝑏 ⋅ sin𝜑2  (14) 
 
 
𝜑𝑖 = atan2�𝑧,�𝑥² +  𝑦²� (15) 
 
 𝜆𝑖 = atan2(𝑦, 𝑥) (16) 
 
where 𝑓 is a fraction along the great circle route (𝑓 = 0 is point 1, 𝑓 = 1 is point 2) and 𝛿 is 
the angular distance 𝑑/𝑟 between the two points in radians. (Williams, 2017) A suitable 
interval for the intermediate points is determined later on in the subchapter 4.4.2 for 
horizontal approach profile simulation. 
4.2.3 Destination with Given Distance and Bearing from Start 
To calculate the location of the emergency landing key point as a bearing and distance 
from the runway threshold the following equations are used: 
 
 𝜑2 = arcsin( sin𝜑1 ∙ cos 𝛿 + cos𝜑1 ∙ sin 𝛿 ∙ cos 𝜃) (17) 
 
 𝜆2 = 𝜆1 + atan2(sin𝜃 ∙ sin 𝛿 ∙ cos𝜑1, cos𝛿 − sin𝜑1 ∙ sin𝜑2) (18) 
 
where 𝜃 is the true bearing from the start point. (Williams, 2017) 
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 4.2.4 Course between Coordinates 
True course 𝜃 from start point to destination can be calculated with equation (Williams, 
2017): 
 
 𝜃 = atan2(sin(𝜆2 − 𝜆1) ∙ cos𝜑2 , cos𝜑1 ∙ sin𝜑2 − sin𝜑1 ∙ cos𝜑2 ∙ cos(𝜆2 − 𝜆1)) (19) 
 
When moving along a great circle path between two coordinates, the actual bearing 
changes gradually. The equation above gives the initial course and is used to determine the 
heading from any point on the STAR route to the emergency landing key point. The 
distances in this study are so short that the heading can be considered constant. 
4.3 Conversions between IAS, TAS, Ground Speed and Mach 
The most important speed for the pilot is the indicated airspeed IAS. It is used for planning 
and executing normal operations (below crossover altitude) to comply with the published 
STAR speed restrictions and restrictions given by the ATC, and to adjust the glide in case 
of an engine failure. IAS for the best glide is constant in steady state gliding flight. Due to 
atmospheric characteristics – variations in pressure, density and air temperature at different 
altitudes – the true airspeed 𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑆 differs from the IAS. To calculate the total time for the 
risk period in the approach, ground speed must be known. It can be easily calculated from 
TAS by subtracting or adding the effect of a wind component: 
 
 𝑉𝐺𝑆 = 𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑆 + 𝑣𝑤 (20) 
 
In the Pilatus PC-12 NG’s Primus Apex avionics the IAS shown for the pilot is corrected 
for position error (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016). Other possible minor instrument errors as well as 
the air compressibility error is disregarded – for the Pilatus PC-12’s speed and altitude 
regime the compressibility error is not significant bearing in mind the nature of this study. 
The difference is of some 2 per cent at maximum between the equivalent airspeed and 
calibrated airspeed at high altitudes and close to maximum speeds (Hoffren and 
Rahikainen, 1992). Thus the relation between IAS and TAS can be expressed as: 
 
 
𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑆 = 𝑉�𝜌0𝜌  (21) 
 
where 𝜌0 is the air density at sea level and 𝜌 the air density at the examined altitude 
(Hoffren and Rahikainen, 1992). The International Standard Atmosphere (ISA) is assumed 
in this study. Some of its most important characteristics are: 
 
- the air is a dry, perfect gas 
- the temperature at sea level is 15°C 
- the pressure at sea level is 1013.2 hPa 
- the temperature gradient is −1.98°C per 1000 feet from sea level up to the altitude 
at which the temperature is −56.5°C (approximately 36 100 ft). (Pilatus Aircraft, 
2016) 
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 Values for some relevant ISA variables are listed in the Table 2 at 1000 feet intervals. 
Moving upwards in the atmosphere the density decreases but the lapse rate is not quite 
linear. The density ratio needed in Equation 21 is interpolated from the table values at 10 
feet intervals. 
 
The Mach number is a comparison between TAS and the local speed of sound 𝑎 (Airbus, 
2002): 
 
 
𝑀 = 𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑆
𝑎
 (22) 
 
The speed of sound in air (assuming ideal gas) depends on the air temperature. Thus, if 
IAS (or TAS) is maintained constant with increasing altitude, the Mach number increases 
as air cools. At some point the Mach number becomes more limiting and must be in turn 
maintained constant. This point is called crossover altitude. The crossover altitude depends 
on the desired IAS and Mach number values. The relation between IAS, TAS and Mach 
number below the tropopause is illustrated in the Figure 8 below. 
 
 
Figure 8. The relative behaviour of IAS, TAS and Mach number as a function of altitude. 
 
The speed of sound in air can be approximated with an equation: 
 
 𝑎 = 20.05√273.15 + 𝑇 (23) 
 
where 𝑇 is the air temperature in Celsius – the result being in metres per second (Airbus, 
2002). Hence, combining the Equations 22 and 23 we get: 
 
 𝑉𝑇𝐴𝑆 = 𝑀 ∙ 20.05√273.15 + 𝑇 (24) 
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 Table 2. The International Standard Atmosphere. (Airbus, 2002) 
Altitude 
[ft] 
Temp. 
[°C] 
Pressure 
[hPa] 
Pressure ratio 𝒑
𝒑𝟎
 Density ratio 𝝆
𝝆𝟎
 
Speed 
of 
sound 
[m/s] 
Altitude 
[m] 
40 000 - 56.5 188 0.1851 0.2462 295.1 12 192 
39 000 - 56.5 197 0.1942 0.2583 295.1 11 887 
38 000 - 56.5 206 0.2038 0.2710 295.1 11 582 
37 000 - 56.5 217 0.2138 0.2844 295.1 11 278 
36 000 - 56.3 227 0.2243 0.2981 295.3 10 973 
35 000 - 54.3 238 0.2353 0.3099 296.6 10 668 
34 000 - 52.4 250 0.2467 0.3220 298.0 10 363 
33 000 - 50.4 262 0.2586 0.3345 299.3 10 058 
32 000 - 48.4 274 0.2709 0.3473 300.6 9 754 
31 000 - 46.4 287 0.2837 0.3605 301.9 9 449 
30 000 - 44.4 301 0.2970 0.3741 303.2 9 144 
29 000 - 42.5 315 0.3107 0.3881 304.6 8 839 
28 000 - 40.5 329 0.3250 0.4025 305.9 8 534 
27 000 - 38.5 344 0.3398 0.4173 307.2 8 230 
26 000 - 36.5 360 0.3552 0.4325 308.5 7 925 
25 000 - 34.5 376 0.3711 0.4481 309.7 7 620 
24 000 - 32.5 393 0.3876 0.4642 311.0 7 315 
23 000 - 30.6 410 0.4046 0.4806 312.3 7 010 
22 000 - 28.6 428 0.4223 0.4976 313.6 6 706 
21 000 - 26.6 446 0.4406 0.5150 314.8 6 401 
20 000 - 24.6 466 0.4595 0.5328 316.1 6 096 
19 000 - 22.6 485 0.4791 0.5511 317.4 5 791 
18 000 - 20.7 506 0.4994 0.5699 318.6 5 406 
17 000 - 18.7 527 0.5203 0.5892 319.9 5 182 
16 000 - 16.7 549 0.5420 0.6090 321.1 4 877 
15 000 - 14.7 572 0.5643 0.6292 322.3 4 572 
14 000 - 12.7 595 0.5875 0.6500 323.6 4 267 
13 000 - 10.8 619 0.6113 0.6713 324.8 3 962 
12 000 -  8.8 644 0.6360 0.6932 326.0 3 658 
11 000 -  6.8 670 0.6614 0.7156 327.2 3 353 
10 000 -  4.8 697 0.6877 0.7385 328.4 3 048 
9 000 -  2.8 724 0.7148 0.7620 329.7 2 743 
8 000 -  0.8 753 0.7428 0.7860 330.9 2 438 
7 000 + 1.1 782 0.7716 0.8106 332.1 2 134 
6 000 + 3.1 812 0.8014 0.8359 333.3 1 829 
5 000 + 5.1 843 0.8320 0.8617 334.5 1 524 
4 000 + 7.1 875 0.8637 0.8881 335.6 1 219 
3 000 + 9.1 908 0.8962 0.9151 336.8 914 
2 000 + 11.0 942 0.9298 0.9428 338.0 610 
1 000 + 13.0 977 0.9644 0.9711 339.2 305 
0 + 15.0 1013 1.0000 1.0000 340.3 0 
- 1 000 + 17.0 1050 1.0366 1.0295 341.5 - 305 
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 4.4 Approach Profile Simulation 
The profile simulation in this study consists of two fundamentally different scenarios: the 
approach profiles that will be flown when the operations are normal and the emergency 
profile in case of an engine failure. The possibility for an engine failure must be considered 
when planning the normal flight profile as the total energy of the aircraft defines whether 
the risk period must be utilised or not. Many other factors, such as the aircraft performance 
capabilities and STAR constraints set the boundary conditions for possible approach 
profiles. The normal flight profile is first discussed in this subchapter. 
 
With the lack of actual Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) data from the PC-12, the flight 
profile must be simulated. The benefit of exploiting theoretical, simulated profile and 
published STAR routes is that it leads to results with less variance than actualised profiles. 
The actual flight route is different for each flight and thus it would be difficult to study, for 
example, the effect of steeper vertical profile to the risk area. In addition, the aeroplane 
navigation system usually calculates the top of descent point and vertical profile according 
to the input STAR route. 
 
For flight planning purposes, studying the published routes sets an excellent starting point 
for determining the duration of the theoretical risk period and finding possible alternative 
emergency landing sites. For any deviations from the STAR routes, pilots can make 
operative inflight calculations when considering the capability to reach the airport or other 
landing sites. The simulated profile is divided in horizontal, vertical and speed profiles. 
Each of them is separately described below. 
4.4.1 Speed Profile 
When constructing the speed profile, important factors to be accounted for are the aircraft 
speed limitations set in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). The Pilatus PC-12 maximum 
certified operating speeds are 240 kt indicated airspeed (IAS) or Mach 0.48. Above the 
defined crossover altitude of 15 200 feet the maximum operating Mach number becomes 
more limiting. The AFM descent performance section assumes the airspeed used is Mach 
0.48 or 236 knots IAS, whichever is lower. (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016) In this study, the 
desired speed during the descent defines the crossover altitude. Above the crossover 
altitude the Mach number 0.46 is used as maximum to provide margin to the maximum 
operating Mach number. The corresponding TAS and IAS values are calculated with 
Equations 24 and 21. The TAS is needed to calculate the time between each coordinate and 
further the exposure time in risk areas. 
 
Two different speed profiles (A and B) are examined to study the effect of speed to the risk 
period. Speed profile B is the same as profile A but with fixed 10 knot addition to all 
indicated air speeds. This means approximately 5 to 10 % increments to the IAS. 
 
The speed after the crossover altitude is maintained constant until deceleration for final 
approach is deemed necessary. The published speed constraints in the STAR routes are 
respected and checked for the simulation. For the speed profile A, the initial descent speed 
is 220 kt (or a lower value if limited by the Mach number 0.46) but at least 10 kt below any 
possible STAR speed limitation. The speed at base leg is 200 kt and 190 kt at the 
beginning of the final. By the final approach point (FAP) or final approach fix (FAF) the 
speed is reduced to 170 kt to allow landing gear extension. The maximum landing gear 
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 operation speed for the PC-12 is 180 knots IAS (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016). There forward the 
speed is reduced gradually to final approach speed as landing configuration for flaps and 
landing gear are extended. Speed reduction is done so that 150 knots is reached by 4 NM 
final and the final speed 90 knots approximately 30 seconds and 0.7 NM before the runway 
threshold. The relatively high speed profile is intentional so as to reduce the exposure time 
in risk areas. However, it should be realistic to fly and to allow required deceleration 
capability considering the PC-12 performance characteristics (Keltanen, 2017). The speeds 
are practicable also from the ATC point of view (Karila, 2017). Again, to validate the 
applicability of the simulated profile, test flights and FDM data would be needed. 
 
Any changes in speeds are simulated to happen gradually, approximately at a rate of 1 knot 
per second. More accurately, the speed change rate is actually 1 knot per simulated data 
point. The data point interval is defined so that the time between each point is close to one 
second (within a couple tenths of a second) until the FAP or FAF. This is done to make the 
data processing simpler. After FAP/FAF the aircraft speed is reduced so that one data point 
interval corresponds to approximately 1.5 – 3.5 seconds. 
4.4.2 Horizontal Profile 
As mentioned, the horizontal profile is assumed to be flown according to published STAR 
routes. Waypoints included in the STAR can be seen in the instrument charts in the 
Appendix 1 and their respective coordinates in the Appendix 2. To examine the full route 
to be flown and to get simulated data between the published waypoints, a sufficient amount 
of intermediate coordinates must be calculated with Equations 10 – 16. The true airspeed 
range for the Pilatus PC-12 during the arrival segment is approximately 180 – 300 knots. 
This means the aircraft travels about 3 to 5 NM per minute over the ground. As a 
reference, 4 NM/min (1/15 NM/s) is selected to get data points at approximately one 
second intervals. Thus, 14 intermediate points are calculated for every nautical mile.  
 
Headings between waypoints can again be seen in the instrument charts. Magnetic 
directions are used and minor differences in magnetic variation between two geographical 
points are disregarded. Changes in the aeroplane heading are simulated as approximately 
standard rate turns (3 degrees per second or to be more precise, per simulated data point). 
4.4.3 Vertical Profile 
According to a modern practise the vertical profile is planned as continuous descent 
approach (CDA) without any level flight segment. The descent gradient after the FAP or 
FAF is defined in the instrument approach charts and the final approach segment is 
simulated accordingly. The optimum final approach descent design gradient is 5.2% (or 
3.0°) (ICAO, 2006). 
 
In the segments preceding the final approach segment the descent angle may be affected by 
the flight crew. In this thesis, the effect of different descent gradients to the risk period is 
examined. Altitude at each simulated data point is calculated applying a fixed descent 
angle and distance to the published FAP/FAF via the approach route and then added to the 
intermediate approach altitude. In addition, any published STAR altitude restrictions are 
complied with. The examined descent angles are 3°, 4° and 5°. If applicable, a limiting en-
route cruise altitude is 28 000 feet. The vertical profile simulation is visualised in the 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Vertical profiles. 
The default descent angle in the Pilatus PC-12 NG Primus Apex avionics is 3 degrees. This 
can be easily modified by the pilot for each waypoint leg. After the modification the 
system calculates new vertical path guidance. The maximum allowable angle is 8 degrees 
and the lowest allowable angle is 1 degree. (Honeywell, 2014) 
4.5 Glide Profile 
When the engine fails and thrust is lost, the aeroplane becomes a glider. The glide profile is 
discussed next. Two different glide profiles are studied: in still air with clean configuration 
glide angle 𝛾𝑚𝑖𝑛 of 3.95 degrees and in 20 kt headwind with glide angle 𝛾𝑤 of 4.8 degrees. 
The headwind is considered constant regardless of the aircraft heading and altitude. The 
scenario is a bit unrealistic but enables the study of wind effect in theory. In reality, the 
number of different wind conditions at different altitudes is infinite. 
 
An immediate and complete loss of thrust is assumed. When the engine failure occurs, the 
aeroplane heading is initially turned towards an emergency landing key point located on a 
short final. The new heading can be calculated with the Equation 19. The calculation gives 
true course which is converted into magnetic heading by subtracting a local variation in the 
area (an average from all given runway threshold variations is used in this study). A second 
turn needed is the final alignment from the initial key point heading to the runway heading. 
As stated before, the Pilatus PC-12 loses altitude approximately 1600 feet during a full 
360-degree turn. This estimate is applied when calculating the lost altitude during the 
manoeuvring. Furthermore, 50 per cent of any excess kinetic energy the aeroplane may 
have compared to the best glide speed at the moment of the engine failure is converted to 
altitude. An equivalent altitude, taking into account the required manoeuvring and excess 
speed, is calculated with the Equation 4. 
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 It is not realistic or reasonable to assume that the emergency glide could be made directly 
to the runway threshold with the best clean configuration glide angle from any point in the 
STAR route. The aeroplane must be aligned to the runway heading and configured for 
landing. After lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps, the best glide angle is 
significantly steeper due to increased drag. It would be more reasonable to examine the 
gliding capability to some predetermined point on the final. For this reason, a special key 
point is defined. The key point is located on short final from where the landing can be 
completed. The glide angle for approach or landing configuration is not usually given in 
the AFM and must be estimated. This is the case also with the Pilatus PC-12. The key 
point procedure in this study is specified in the subchapter 4.5.1 below.  
 
The key point is the glide reference from any point on the STAR and intermediate 
approach before the FAF/FAP. After the FAF/FAP the aeroplane is already aligned for the 
final approach and the reference point then for the examination is located 50 feet above the 
runway threshold. A distance from any coordinate to the key point (or threshold) can be 
calculated with the Equation 9. When the distance, altitude and the glide angle are known 
it is easy to calculate whether the aeroplane can glide to the desired point. 
4.5.1 Emergency Landing Key Point 
Various key point methods are developed worldwide for single-engine aircraft engine 
failure cases. The idea of a key point is to align the aircraft safely for landing without 
engine power. Some key point methods utilise multiple points (high key – low key) and 
might require even 2000 feet height above the landing site for manoeuvring. A single key 
point located on 0.5 NM final and at the altitude of 500 feet above the runway threshold 
(THR) elevation is used in this study (see Figure 10). This yields in approximately 9.3 
degree angle for the final glide. The idea of this single key point method is to minimise the 
risk period when flying at low altitudes around the destination aerodrome. Coordinates for 
the key point for each runway are calculated with the Equations 17 and 18. 
 
 
Figure 10. The key point profile in this study. 
The defined key point should allow safe emergency landing in most cases, considering the 
sophisticated navigational capabilities of the PC-12 (Keltanen, 2017). The aeroplane is 
flown to the key point in clean configuration and with the defined best glide speed. The 
landing configuration is selected and final alignment is done after the key point. The actual 
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 gliding capability of the PC-12 in other than clean configuration is unknown. A similar 
estimation of a typical SET aeroplane’s gliding capability in landing configuration (10 
degrees) was made by the QinetiQ working group in their SET-IMC operations risk 
assessment (Bradley, 2007).  
 
Cloud base of approximately 500 feet above the ground level should be enough for the 
pilot to make a visual contact with the touchdown point and yet have enough time to make 
final alignment and configure the aircraft for landing. If the prevailing cloud base is lower 
or the visibility on ground is poor, the help of navigation instruments is needed. The key 
point should be programmed into the navigation system together with the threshold 
coordinates. With the help of these two points the autopilot function could be utilised to 
reduce the pilot workload. However, if the aircraft is equipped with a sophisticated 
synthetic vision system (optionally available for the Pilatus PC-12 NG) it could be 
exploited to navigate the aeroplane directly to the threshold also in weather conditions well 
below the VMC minima. Furthermore, if the runway is equipped with ILS the correct 
frequency should be tuned to provide additional situational information. 
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 5 Case Study: Pilatus PC-12/47E at Helsinki Airport 
5.1 Introduction 
The reason for selecting Helsinki Airport (EFHK) for the case study is not only because it 
is the most familiar airport for the author but also because Finnish CAA has been a 
forerunner and supporter of commercial SET-IMC operations. The first approved Pilatus 
PC-12 operator in Europe, Hendell Aviation, is located in Finland and its main base is on 
Helsinki Airport. They got their Air Operator Certificate (AOC) already in 2013 (Hendell 
Aviation, 2017). Since then, also another PC-12 operator, Go! Aviation, were granted an 
AOC in 2016 by the Finnish CAA but the company faced unbearable financial difficulties 
and the operations were run down in 2017. Moreover, there is no high terrain or extensive 
amount of other obstacles around the Helsinki Airport, which would unnecessarily increase 
the complexity of the study. 
 
The Pilatus PC-12 has been a particularly popular aircraft for commercial SET operations 
in North America. Also in Europe, the PC-12 is the most active aeroplane for non-
commercial business aviation flights. (Koe, 2016) The aircraft is very suitable for 
commercial operations due to its performance capabilities, versatility, modern avionics and 
economical features. These are without a doubt also the reasons why the previously 
mentioned AOC holders have ended up with Pilatus PC-12. And it can be reasonably 
expected to become the choice for many of the future SET operators in Europe. 
 
As a natural consequence, the Pilatus PC-12 was selected as the reference aeroplane in this 
study. The technical specifications of the PC-12 are introduced in more detail in the 
subchapter 3.4.1 and in the chapter 4. With this aeroplane-airport combination, this thesis 
would have the potential to provide valuable information for operators. 
5.2 EFHK Approaches and Runways 
5.2.1 Introduction 
There are three runways at Helsinki Airport. All runways have instrument landing 
procedures for both opposite runway ends.  Therefore, there are a total of six landing 
directions. Descent gradient at final segment is 5.2% (3.0°) for all EFHK approaches 
except for runway 33 approaches it is 6.1% (3.5°). (Finavia, 2017) The runway 
characteristics are presented in the Table 3. For the approach profile simulation in this 
study, the published instrument landing system (ILS) procedures are applied when 
available. According to the ILS procedure, a minimum speed of 150 kt IAS is required to 
be maintained until 4 NM from the touch down zone (Finavia, 2017). This has been taken 
into account in the simulated speed profile. At EFHK the only runway without ILS is the 
runway 33. For this runway, an approach based on area navigation (RNAV) system is 
utilised in the simulation. 
 
The preferential runway (RWY) for landing at EFHK is in the following order: RWY 15, 
RWY 22L, RWY 04L, RWY 04R, RWY 22R and RWY 33. The selection of runway in 
use is based on temporary restrictions concerning runway availability and safety aspects, 
such as wind direction and runway condition. (Finavia, 2017) 
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 All runways have at least six STAR routes that begin from waypoints called DIVAM, 
INTOR, LAKUT, LUSEP, ROPAM and VEPIN. The STARs are named accordingly, for 
example DIVAM 1M for runway 15 from point DIVAM. For parallel runways 04L/04R 
and 22L/22R dependent or independent parallel approaches are possible, especially during 
the airport peak hours. To keep the minimum required radar separation, there must be at 
least 1000 feet vertical (or 3 NM lateral) separation between the two aircraft approaching 
parallel runways final course. The northern runway 04L/22R is the lower side. Therefore, 
the aircraft approaching this runway need to fly prolonged periods of time at lower than 
optimum altitudes. This is has been taken into account also in the STAR design with 
maximum altitude constraints. For the parallel approaches, there are three additional 
STARs for 04L and one for 22R. The total number of STARs at Helsinki Airport is 40. 
(Finavia, 2017). 
Table 3. Helsinki Airport runway physical characteristics. (Finavia, 2017) 
Runway 
Magnetic 
bearing 
[°] 
Magnetic 
variation 
[°E] 
Dimensions 
[m] 
Runway THR position 
[Lat / Long] 
Elev. 
[ft] 
Final 
appr. 
angle 
[°] 
04L 039 8.47 
3060 x 60 
601846.61N / 0245413.93E 133.6 3 
22R 219 8.50 601952.11N / 0245638.01E 179.2 3 
04R 039 8.04 
3500 x 60 
601840.65N / 0245610.94E 151.6 3 
22L 219 8.54 601950.49N / 0245844.73E 148.6 3 
15 145 8.51 
2901 x 60 
601948.99N / 0245752.19E 162.9 3 
33 325 8.06 601825.44N / 0245917.83E 147.1 3.5 
 
The magnetic variations are calculated differences between published magnetic and 
geographical runway bearings. The average magnetic variation of all runway thresholds is 
approximately 8.35°E. This value is needed when converting true courses between two 
coordinates into magnetic headings. 
 
In the vicinity of Helsinki Airport, there are no significant high obstacles or terrain that 
would have to be considered during an emergency glide. Thus the emergency landing 
procedure can be planned directly towards the key point or runway threshold. 
5.2.2 Risk Mitigation Means 
There are three main measures identified in this study to mitigate the risk yielding from 
flying at low altitudes during the approach phase. First, a steeper than nominal descent 
angle can be utilised in the arrival segment. Sometimes altitude constraints are published 
and must be taken into account. Helsinki Airport is suitable for this study due to low 
number of altitude restrictions that would require being at or below a defined altitude. Only 
a few STARs have these constraints to meet the requirements of parallel approaches. 
Therefore, both the effect of unrestricted higher profile and the influence of altitude 
constraints can be examined. From the ATC perspective, there are no other restrictions 
related to, for example, separation to other aircraft that would prevent the use of steep 
descent. Lateral separation is applied for the approaching traffic (Karila, 2017). 
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Second, increased speeds can be used during the approach. This will decrease the exposure 
time over the risk areas and possibly reduce the risk area, when excess speed is converted 
to altitude. Some speed constraints are given for the approaches at EFHK and they must be 
respected unless the restrictions are specifically cancelled by the ATC. On the other hand, 
considering the PC-12 approach phase speed range, the published maximum speed 
limitations might not become limiting in most cases. Moreover, the ATC can normally 
accept, for example, a speed of 210 kt during the base leg and 200 kt until 10 NM final 
during the parallel approaches if required (Karila, 2017). 
 
Third, alternative emergency landing sites can be preselected to avoid using the risk 
period. This can be done when the geographical risk areas are identified. One objective of 
this thesis is to locate these risk areas around the Helsinki Airport. Due to flat terrain and 
relatively sparsely populated areas there should be a great number of suitable emergency 
landing sites in the vicinity of EFHK. 
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 6 Results 
In this study, 40 standard instrument arrivals were examined for three runways from both 
landing directions at Helsinki Airport. The simulated data set for each STAR consisted of 
400 – 1400 data points making the total number of data points in the study approximately 
35 000. Each data point was linked with more than 20 parameters. The parameter values 
altered when the descent and speed profiles were varied and headwind component added.  
 
As a result, an Excel spreadsheet calculation tool was constructed. An example of the view 
from the software is given in the Figure 11. For clarity, all of the spreadsheet parameters 
are not presented in the figure. Own spreadsheet tab was constructed for each STAR, 
consisting the related actual waypoints, intermediate points, headings in between these 
points and altitude and speed constraints. 
 
The spreadsheet requires input values for the speed profile and descent angle. It then 
returns the total time spent in the approach phase and the total risk period. If the equivalent 
altitude at any point is less than the required altitude, the time interval is counted as risk 
period. Other variables that could be easily altered in the spreadsheet for further study 
include: 
 
- the desired best glide speed  
- best glide angle  
- altitude lost during a 360-turn  
- headwind component  
- maximum limited en-route altitude  
- maximum Mach number  
- percentage amount of excess speed converter to altitude; and 
- the emergency landing key point location (height above and distance from the 
runway threshold). 
 
For these parameters, fixed values presented in the previous chapters were used in this 
thesis. 
 
Full results for the total time in approach, risk periods and the effect of altering descent and 
speed profiles (both in still air and in headwind) can be found in the Tables A3.1. – A3.8. 
in the Appendix 3. Furthermore, for better visualisation of the results, the geographical risk 
areas are illustrated over a map in the Appendix 4 Figures A4.1 – A4.42. Red colour 
indicates an area from where the aeroplane could not reach the runway in use whereas the 
green dots represent safe areas. The most important results are next presented and analysed 
in this chapter. 
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 6.1 Still Air 
6.1.1 Risk Period and Risk Mitigation 
First, the results in still air are reviewed. The total time in approach for the STARs at 
Helsinki Airport, simulated to be flown with the Pilatus PC-12 varied between 
approximately 7.5 and 23 minutes for all descent and altitude profiles. The average 
duration was around 15 minutes. By using 10 kt higher indicated airspeed throughout the 
approach (speed profile B), 30 to 50 seconds could be saved depending on the length of the 
approach. Also, flying higher descent profile led to increased TAS and thus less time (5 to 
25 seconds) in the approach. The combined effect was 1 minute 10 seconds at maximum. 
 
However, the more interesting results are related to the risk period. The average risk period 
for the nominal 3 degree glide and speed profile A was 9 minutes 4 seconds. The result is 
substantially high, considering the maximum usable risk period is 15 minutes for the whole 
flight. The maximum theoretical risk period was as much as 16 minutes 53 seconds 
(PEXEN 4B for runway 04L). The minimum value was slightly over 6 minutes. 
 
The variation in how much the steeper descent decreases the risk period was remarkable – 
for example 4 degree descent reduced the risk period on runway 22R LUSEP 3V arrival 
only a few seconds (−0.9 %) but over 6 and a half minutes (−56.0 %) on runway 15 
LUSEP 1M arrival. This example already revealed the relevance of the altitude constraints 
in the arrival. Both final approach segments have the same 3 degree profile and begin from 
2000 feet. Both arrivals are close to 45 NM in length but runway 22R has longer final and 
the altitude restricted to at 2000 feet already on the base leg due to possible parallel 
approaches. 
 
On average, the 4 degree descent before FAF/FAP decreased the risk period 16.8 % and 5 
degree angle 30.9 % in still air. The 5 degree descent could reduce the risk period up to 
over 65 % in some cases. This might be more than 8 minutes in time. On the other hand, 
for some altitude restricted approaches even the 5 degrees were not enough to significantly 
affect the risk period. These are however special cases at EFHK and usually the reduction 
is at least 15 % compared to 3 degree nominal descent. The average risk period for a 4 
degree speed A profile was 7 minutes 34 seconds and for 5 degree profile 6 minutes 9 
seconds. These sound more acceptable than the over 9 minutes for 3 degree profile. The 
shortest risk periods were only 3.5 minutes for the runway 33. The risk periods for runway 
33 are generally somewhat smaller than for the other runways. This is due to slightly 
higher final approach angle 3.5°. 
 
Applying the speed profile B provided an incremental risk period reduction of 
approximately 5 % or on average 30 seconds for all descent angles. The total effect of 
applying higher speed comes from two reasons – it will naturally decrease the time spent in 
the risk area but it also makes the risk area somewhat smaller as more excess kinetic 
energy can be transformed into altitude. 
 
The total risk periods for all STARs and different flight profiles can be seen in Table 4. 
Values exceeding 15 minutes are shown in red. The changes in risk periods compared to 
the 3 degree descent with speed profile A are furthermore presented in the Table 5. 
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 Table 4. Approach risk period in still air. 
  Risk period (still air) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 13:27 12:45 13:10 12:34 05:01 04:37 
 INTOR 4B 06:51 06:23 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 LAKUT 5B 06:48 06:20 05:37 05:13 05:02 04:40 
 LUSEP 1B 06:32 06:07 05:37 05:13 05:02 04:40 
 ROPAM 1B 06:42 06:17 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 VEPIN 1B 06:42 06:17 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 MAROM 4B 10:42 09:57 09:20 08:47 09:06 08:34 
 NAPUN 1B 09:38 09:04 09:20 08:47 09:06 08:34 
 PEXEN 4B 16:53 16:02 16:37 15:50 12:32 11:50 
04R DIVAM 1R 13:46 13:03 13:31 12:54 06:45 06:15 
 INTOR 4R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
 LAKUT 5R 07:54 07:24 06:49 06:22 06:11 05:47 
 LUSEP 1R 07:42 07:14 06:49 06:22 06:11 05:47 
 ROPAM 1R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
 VEPIN 1R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
15 DIVAM 1M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 INTOR 5M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 LAKUT 5M 11:14 10:38 05:34 05:10 04:40 04:18 
 LUSEP 1M 11:50 10:51 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 ROPAM 1M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 VEPIN 1M 08:19 07:32 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
22L DIVAM 2A 07:15 06:48 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 INTOR 3A 07:15 06:48 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 LAKUT 3A 07:23 06:55 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:28 
 LUSEP 2A 12:36 11:56 06:27 06:01 05:48 05:24 
 ROPAM 2A 07:24 06:56 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 VEPIN 2A 13:08 12:26 10:33 09:47 06:14 05:45 
22R DIVAM 2V 08:14 07:45 07:47 07:19 07:26 06:58 
 INTOR 3V 08:44 08:12 07:56 07:27 07:27 06:59 
 LAKUT 3V 10:24 09:47 09:29 08:55 09:02 08:30 
 LUSEP 3V 13:03 12:22 12:57 12:16 12:50 12:09 
 PEXEN 3V 10:24 09:47 09:29 08:55 09:02 08:30 
 ROPAM 2V 10:28 09:45 08:11 07:41 07:29 07:01 
 VEPIN 2V 13:37 12:54 13:22 12:42 10:12 09:35 
33 DIVAM 1W 09:07 08:41 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 INTOR 4W 09:43 09:11 07:55 07:23 03:30 03:09 
 LAKUT 5W 06:31 06:06 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 LUSEP 1W 06:31 06:06 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 ROPAM 1W 08:15 07:47 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 VEPIN 1W 06:33 06:08 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
Min.  06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 03:30 03:09 
Max.  16:53 16:02 16:37 15:50 12:50 12:09 
Average  09:04 08:31 07:34 07:06 06:09 05:44 
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 Table 5. Risk period change with different profiles compared to 3 degree speed A profile in still air. 
  Risk period change (still air) [%] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B - −5.2 % −2.2 % −6.6 % −62.7 % −65.6 % 
 INTOR 4B - −6.7 % −17.8 % −23.4 % −26.5 % −31.8 % 
 LAKUT 5B - −6.9 % −17.4 % −23.1 % −25.9 % −31.2 % 
 LUSEP 1B - −6.3 % −14.1 % −20.1 % −23.0 % −28.5 % 
 ROPAM 1B - −6.3 % −15.9 % −21.7 % −24.8 % −30.2 % 
 VEPIN 1B - −6.3 % −15.9 % −21.7 % −24.8 % −30.2 % 
 MAROM 4B - −7.0 % −12.8 % −17.9 % −14.9 % −19.9 % 
 NAPUN 1B - −5.8 % −3.1 % −8.7 % −5.4 % −11.0 % 
 PEXEN 4B - −5.1 % −1.6 % −6.3 % −25.7 % −30.0 % 
04R DIVAM 1R - −5.2 % −1.8 % −6.3 % −50.9 % −54.6 % 
 INTOR 4R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
 LAKUT 5R - −6.3 % −13.7 % −19.4 % −21.6 % −26.7 % 
 LUSEP 1R - −6.2 % −11.5 % −17.4 % −19.6 % −24.9 % 
 ROPAM 1R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
 VEPIN 1R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
15 DIVAM 1M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 INTOR 5M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 LAKUT 5M - −5.3 % −50.4 % −53.9 % −58.4 % −61.6 % 
 LUSEP 1M - −8.3 % −56.0 % −59.1 % −61.0 % −63.8 % 
 ROPAM 1M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 VEPIN 1M - −9.6 % −37.4 % −41.8 % −44.6 % −48.5 % 
22L DIVAM 2A - −6.3 % −11.0 % −17.0 % −19.2 % −24.8 % 
 INTOR 3A - −6.3 % −11.0 % −17.0 % −19.2 % −24.8 % 
 LAKUT 3A - −6.2 % −12.5 % −18.4 % −20.7 % −25.9 % 
 LUSEP 2A - −5.3 % −48.8 % −52.2 % −54.0 % −57.2 % 
 ROPAM 2A - −6.4 % −12.8 % −18.8 % −20.9 % −26.4 % 
 VEPIN 2A - −5.3 % −19.7 % −25.5 % −52.5 % −56.2 % 
22R DIVAM 2V - −6.0 % −5.6 % −11.3 % −9.9 % −15.4 % 
 INTOR 3V - −6.0 % −9.2 % −14.7 % −14.8 % −20.0 % 
 LAKUT 3V - −5.9 % −8.8 % −14.2 % −13.1 % −18.2 % 
 LUSEP 3V - −5.3 % −0.9 % −6.1 % −1.7 % −6.9 % 
 PEXEN 3V - −5.9 % −8.8 % −14.2 % −13.1 % −18.2 % 
 ROPAM 2V - −6.9 % −21.8 % −26.6 % −28.6 % −33.0 % 
 VEPIN 2V - −5.2 % −1.8 % −6.8 % −25.1 % −29.6 % 
33 DIVAM 1W - −4.7 % −41.5 % −45.4 % −61.7 % −65.4 % 
 INTOR 4W - −5.5 % −18.5 % −24.1 % −64.1 % −67.6 % 
 LAKUT 5W - −6.5 % −18.1 % −23.6 % −46.4 % −51.7 % 
 LUSEP 1W - −6.5 % −18.1 % −23.6 % −46.4 % −51.7 % 
 ROPAM 1W - −5.7 % −35.3 % −39.6 % −57.6 % −61.8 % 
 VEPIN 1W - −6.5 % −18.6 % −24.0 % −46.7 % −51.9 % 
Min.  - −9.6 % −56.0 % −59.1 % −64.1 % −67.6 % 
Max.  - −4.7 % −0.9 % −6.1 % −1.7 % −6.9 % 
Average  - −6.2 % −16.8 % −22.1 % −30.9 % −35.7 % 
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 6.1.2 Risk Areas 
It is difficult to get a clear picture of the geographical location of the risk areas from the 
spreadsheet calculation results. Utilising a free web based GPSVisualizer, a map overlaid 
HTML document can be created and the risk areas examined in more detail and more 
interactively. The waypoint name, coordinates, altitude and risk period colour columns 
were extracted into a separate Excel file. This file was input in the GPSVisualiser which 
returned a graphic map of the risk areas. The map type can be altered but by selecting, for 
example, a Google aerial/satellite image as the background the risk areas can be identified 
and possible alternative emergency landing sites scanned initially. 
 
As the runway 15 is the preferred landing runway at the Helsinki Airport, the visualised 
results for this runway are presented in more detail in this chapter. The results for the other 
runways can be seen in the Appendix 4. 
 
In addition to STAR altitude constraints, another significant arrival design and structure 
related factor that can be seen to have effect in the risk period is the relation between the 
initial point in the STAR and the runway in use. For straight in approaches, when the track 
miles are considerably less and the route closes more directly towards the runway, risk 
period was greater compared to arrival routes that circle around the airport. The difference 
narrowed when higher descent angles were used. This can be seen in the risk area 
illustrations in the Figures 12 – 17 and in the Appendix 4. In most cases, the risk area 
behaviour was straightforward – once the aeroplane entered the risk area, the rest of the 
approach was beyond the glide distance. Occasionally, as in 3 degree VEPIN 1M arrival 
for the runway 15 (Figure 12), the flight exited the risk area and then entered again later in 
the approach. 
 
The Table A3.4 in the Appendix 3 reveals that on average the risk period in percentage of 
total time in approach was roughly 60 % for 3 degree profile, 50 % for 4 degrees and 40 % 
for 5 degrees. Yet, the dispersion for the values was substantial and for many of the 
shallower profile or altitude restricted straight in approaches it was 100 %. The finding can 
be confirmed also from the risk area visualisations. 
 
The final approach after the FAF/FAP was entirely risk period in this study as the final 
approach angle was always smaller than the best glide angle. The study indicated that it is 
not possible to fly the approach with such speeds that the excess kinetic energy would be 
sufficient to enable the glide down to runway threshold without engine thrust. Then again, 
maintaining high speeds during the final approach will decrease the risk period exposure 
time. Moreover, it might be a requirement to fly high speed approaches at major airports, 
such as EFHK, to allow fluent traffic flow among faster aircraft. Therefore, the final 
approach high speed profile in this study is justified. 
 
Applying 10 knots higher speed (speed profile B) in the approach had only a marginal 
effect to the geographical risk area (Figures 12 – 17). For this reason, the visualisations for 
both speed profiles and for all runways are not necessary. Only the speed profile A is 
visualised in the Appendix 4. 
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Figure 12. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure 13. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile B, still air. 
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Figure 14. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure 15. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile B, still air. 
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Figure 16. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure 17. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile B, still air. 
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 The benefit of GPSVisualizer output file being a HTML file is that the map could be 
zoomed and the flight path examined quite accurately. An example of a close-up image of 
runway 15 left base leg (4 degree profile) is given in the Figure 18. It can be seen that 
nearby there are many potential fields that could fulfil the requirements of an emergency 
landing area. 
 
 
Figure 18. A zoomed in aerial image of RWY 15 left base leg. 
Another excellent feature of the visualisation tool is the possibility to create a Google Earth 
compatible KML/KMZ file. The result can be then viewed in 3D. This is a great tool for 
visualising and comparing different glide angles simultaneously (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 19. INTOR 5M arrival RWY 15 risk area 3D visualization (3°, 4° and 5° profiles). 
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 6.2 Headwind 
6.2.1 Risk Period and Risk Mitigation 
One aim of this thesis was to examine the effect of headwind to the risk period and risk 
area. A constant 20 knot headwind was selected for the study and the results are now 
discussed and compared to the still air results. The headwind leads to lower ground speed 
and thus increased total time in the approach phase and risk area exposure time. As 
mentioned before, it is unrealistic that the headwind component would stay constant 
regardless of the aircraft altitude and heading. Consequently, the results for the headwind 
analysis include a greater margin of error than for the still air analysis. 
 
The total approach time varied between 8.5 and 25.5 minutes with the average being 
approximately 16.5 minutes. Hence, the slower ground speed had an effect of one and a 
half minute to the total time in approach. The speed profile B decreased the total time 
slightly more than in the still air case as the percentage addition to ground speed was 
higher: 35 to 65 seconds. Increased TAS in steeper descent profile reduced approach time 
by 10 – 30 seconds. The maximum combined effect of higher speed and steeper profile 
was 1 minute 25 seconds. 
 
The average risk period for 3 degree glide and speed profile A with the headwind was 12 
minutes 12 seconds. This was almost 35 % more than in still air. The difference is 
remarkable and again it must be noted that the total duration of the risk period should not 
exceed 15 minutes per flight without a risk assessment for the route. In many STARs the 
risk period was over 15 minutes especially with the 3 degree descent. 
 
With steeper descent profile the risk period can be reduced significantly also in headwind 
conditions. The results are close to still air conditions in percentages: 4 degree descent 
decreased the risk period by 16.4 % on average (16.8 % in still air) and the 5 degree 
descent 26.4 % (30.9 % in still air). The saved time was respectively 2 minutes 21 seconds 
(4 degrees) and 3 minutes 30 seconds (5 degrees). For some STARs, the higher descent 
angle reduced the risk period well over 10 minutes and 60 per cents. The average risk 
period for 4 degree speed A profile was 9 minutes 51 seconds and for 5 degree profile 8 
minutes 42 seconds. These averages were yet 30 – 40 % more than without wind. It is also 
worth noting that even the shortest risk period with speed profile A was 6 minutes 5 
seconds compared to 3 minutes 30 seconds in still air. 
 
In headwind, the effect of using higher speed during the descent was slightly emphasised. 
The speed profile B decreased the risk period by some 40 seconds. In percentages, the 
reduction was practically the same as in no wind conditions. 
 
The total risk periods for all STARs and different flight profiles in headwind are presented 
in the Table 6. Values exceeding 15 minutes are again shown in red. The changes in risk 
periods compared to the 3 degree descent with speed profile A are given in the Table 7. 
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 Table 6. Approach risk period in 20 knot headwind. 
  Risk period (20 kt headwind) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 15:00 14:07 14:39 13:53 14:29 13:47 
 INTOR 4B 14:41 13:49 07:39 07:04 06:37 06:05 
 LAKUT 5B 13:49 13:00 07:33 06:59 06:36 06:04 
 LUSEP 1B 07:53 07:19 07:23 06:51 06:36 06:04 
 ROPAM 1B 08:04 07:29 07:33 07:00 06:37 06:05 
 VEPIN 1B 08:55 08:20 07:33 07:00 06:37 06:05 
 MAROM 4B 17:49 16:48 10:50 10:08 10:36 09:54 
 NAPUN 1B 13:11 12:26 10:52 10:09 10:36 09:54 
 PEXEN 4B 18:48 17:43 18:29 17:29 18:18 17:23 
04R DIVAM 1R 15:22 14:28 15:04 14:17 14:55 14:12 
 INTOR 4R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
 LAKUT 5R 15:05 14:04 08:57 08:18 08:04 07:28 
 LUSEP 1R 09:15 08:36 08:44 08:08 08:05 07:28 
 ROPAM 1R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
 VEPIN 1R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
15 DIVAM 1M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 INTOR 5M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 LAKUT 5M 12:35 11:49 12:19 11:35 06:32 06:01 
 LUSEP 1M 14:16 13:25 10:47 09:57 06:05 05:37 
 ROPAM 1M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 VEPIN 1M 17:11 16:19 07:15 06:40 06:05 05:37 
22L DIVAM 2A 08:44 08:07 08:14 07:38 07:45 07:08 
 INTOR 3A 08:44 08:07 08:14 07:38 07:45 07:08 
 LAKUT 3A 09:04 08:26 08:21 07:45 07:38 07:04 
 LUSEP 2A 14:07 13:15 13:50 13:02 07:38 07:04 
 ROPAM 2A 10:03 09:17 08:23 07:47 07:37 07:03 
 VEPIN 2A 14:40 13:47 14:22 13:35 12:24 11:41 
22R DIVAM 2V 11:00 10:20 09:14 08:36 08:50 08:13 
 INTOR 3V 12:13 11:19 09:40 08:59 08:59 08:22 
 LAKUT 3V 18:35 17:31 11:27 10:42 10:44 10:01 
 LUSEP 3V 14:38 13:46 14:30 13:38 14:22 13:30 
 PEXEN 3V 17:14 16:22 11:27 10:42 10:44 10:01 
 ROPAM 2V 13:04 12:16 10:41 09:56 09:17 08:38 
 VEPIN 2V 15:13 14:19 14:55 14:04 14:42 13:56 
33 DIVAM 1W 18:16 17:24 07:19 06:46 06:13 05:44 
 INTOR 4W 10:57 10:16 10:47 10:06 08:56 08:16 
 LAKUT 5W 07:51 07:17 07:17 06:45 06:13 05:44 
 LUSEP 1W 07:51 07:17 07:17 06:45 06:13 05:44 
 ROPAM 1W 09:21 08:44 08:21 07:25 06:13 05:44 
 VEPIN 1W 14:45 13:47 07:18 06:46 06:13 05:44 
Min.  07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
Max.  18:48 17:43 18:29 17:29 18:18 17:23 
Average  12:12 11:26 09:51 09:11 08:42 08:06 
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 Table 7. Risk period change with different profiles compared to 3 degree speed A profile in 20 knot headwind. 
  Risk period change (20 kt headwind) [%] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B - −5.9 % −2.3 % −7.4 % −3.5 % −8.0 % 
 INTOR 4B - −5.9 % −47.9 % −51.8 % −55.0 % −58.5 % 
 LAKUT 5B - −6.0 % −45.3 % −49.4 % −52.2 % −56.1 % 
 LUSEP 1B - −7.2 % −6.5 % −13.1 % −16.4 % −23.1 % 
 ROPAM 1B - −7.1 % −6.3 % −13.2 % −18.0 % −24.5 % 
 VEPIN 1B - −6.5 % −15.2 % −21.4 % −25.8 % −31.7 % 
 MAROM 4B - −5.8 % −39.2 % −43.1 % −40.5 % −44.5 % 
 NAPUN 1B - −5.6 % −17.5 % −22.9 % −19.5 % −24.9 % 
 PEXEN 4B - −5.7 % −1.7 % −7.0 % −2.7 % −7.5 % 
04R DIVAM 1R - −5.9 % −1.9 % −7.1 % −2.9 % −7.6 % 
 INTOR 4R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
 LAKUT 5R - −6.7 % −40.6 % −44.9 % −46.5 % −50.4 % 
 LUSEP 1R - −7.0 % −5.6 % −12.2 % −12.6 % −19.2 % 
 ROPAM 1R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
 VEPIN 1R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
15 DIVAM 1M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 INTOR 5M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 LAKUT 5M - −6.1 % −2.1 % −8.0 % −48.1 % −52.2 % 
 LUSEP 1M - −5.9 % −24.4 % −30.2 % −57.3 % −60.7 % 
 ROPAM 1M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 VEPIN 1M - −5.1 % −57.8 % −61.3 % −64.6 % −67.3 % 
22L DIVAM 2A - −7.1 % −5.8 % −12.6 % −11.3 % −18.4 % 
 INTOR 3A - −7.1 % −5.8 % −12.6 % −11.3 % −18.4 % 
 LAKUT 3A - −7.0 % −7.9 % −14.5 % −15.9 % −22.1 % 
 LUSEP 2A - −6.1 % −2.0 % −7.6 % −46.0 % −50.0 % 
 ROPAM 2A - −7.6 % −16.6 % −22.6 % −24.2 % −29.8 % 
 VEPIN 2A - −6.0 % −2.0 % −7.4 % −15.4 % −20.3 % 
22R DIVAM 2V - −6.0 % −16.0 % −21.7 % −19.7 % −25.3 % 
 INTOR 3V - −7.4 % −20.9 % −26.4 % −26.4 % −31.5 % 
 LAKUT 3V - −5.7 % −38.4 % −42.5 % −42.2 % −46.1 % 
 LUSEP 3V - −6.0 % −0.9 % −6.9 % −1.8 % −7.7 % 
 PEXEN 3V - −5.1 % −33.6 % −38.0 % −37.7 % −41.8 % 
 ROPAM 2V - −6.1 % −18.2 % −23.9 % −29.0 % −34.0 % 
 VEPIN 2V - −5.9 % −1.9 % −7.6 % −3.3 % −8.4 % 
33 DIVAM 1W - −4.8 % −59.9 % −62.9 % −66.0 % −68.6 % 
 INTOR 4W - −6.4 % −1.6 % −7.9 % −18.5 % −24.5 % 
 LAKUT 5W - −7.2 % −7.1 % −13.9 % −20.8 % −26.9 % 
 LUSEP 1W - −7.2 % −7.1 % −13.9 % −20.8 % −26.9 % 
 ROPAM 1W - −6.6 % −10.7 % −20.7 % −33.5 % −38.7 % 
 VEPIN 1W - −6.5 % −50.5 % −54.1 % −57.9 % −61.1 % 
Min.  - −7.6 % −59.9 % −62.9 % −66.0 % −68.6 % 
Max.  - −4.8 % −0.9 % −6.9 % −1.8 % −7.5 % 
Average  - −6.4 % −16.4 % −22.2 % −26.4 % −31.6 % 
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 6.2.2 Risk Areas 
Risk area results for the runway 15 are shown in the Figures 20 – 25. The other runway 
visualisations are very similar in principle and are presented in the Appendix 4. The speed 
profile B does not again make a notable difference to the risk area and therefore the 
visualisations are given here only for the runway 15. 
 
As could be expected, the risk areas have grown to some extent compared to the still air 
analysis. Otherwise the same regularities could be found from the risk areas for both wind 
conditions. Straight in approaches are the most prone to extensive risk area exposure. With 
5 degree descents the remaining risk areas start to become more reasonable in size from all 
arrival directions. 
 
As a result from decreased gliding capability in headwind, a greater proportion of the total 
approach time is risk period. The Table A3.8 in the Appendix 3 indicates that for the 3° 
descent the percentage of risk period was approximately 75 %, for 4° descent 60 % and for 
the 5° descent 55 % on average. Geographically the ratio is not quite as high since speed is 
lower in the later stages of the approach and at lower altitudes. That is also where the risk 
areas are usually located. The number of approaches that were completely within risk area, 
regardless of the applied descent angle, was also increased. 
 
 
Figure 20. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
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Figure 21. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile B, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure 22. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
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Figure 23. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile B, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure 24. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
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Figure 25. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile B, 20 kt headwind. 
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 7 Discussion 
The method used in this study was a theoretical computational analysis. Due to general 
nature and unpredictability of commercial aviation, performance and safety related pre-
flight calculations made to fulfil the regulations and minimum acceptable safety level, are 
often theoretical. In that sense, this study is not an exception. This must be kept in mind 
when making interpretations of the results. The case study is theoretical considering 
STAR’s are rarely flown entirely from the final route waypoint to the IAF at Helsinki 
Airport. At some point ATC vectors are usually expected. However, the vectored routes 
often more or less follow the STAR routes. Also shortcuts can be expected. In that case, 
distance to the runway might stay shorter than in the arrival route and the actual risk period 
is cut as a consequence. 
 
The results are, nevertheless, reasonable and credible. This analysis provides additional 
information and a new tool for the SET operators and aviation authorities. In some cases, 
the arising risk period in the approach was surprisingly high – even over 15 minutes. It 
must be noted that many conservative estimates and values were applied in this work. The 
actual risk periods could stay shorter. An approach phase risk period estimate used in 
QinetiQ working group’s SET-IMC risk assessment was approximately 4.5 minutes 
(Bradley, 2007). Although the flight profile in the study was somewhat different, the 
applicability of such a short risk period can be questioned for many cases in the light of the 
results in this thesis. 
 
Risk areas could be identified all around the airport, depending on the runway in use. The 
risk period can be easily reduced by selecting a predetermined alternative emergency 
landing site. These landing areas should be explored from all directions suitable distance 
away from the airport. Taking into account the usual position of the risk areas in this study, 
a possible location could be close below the final approach course. In addition, there is 
generally less built-up environment below. For Helsinki Airport, there are plenty of 
suitable fields in the vicinity and even another airport, Helsinki-Malmi Airport 
approximately 7 kilometres south-east of the EFHK. Some other uncontrolled aerodromes 
slightly further away, for instance, in Nummela and in Hyvinkää could be utilised as well. 
By selecting a sufficient amount of alternative emergency landing sites, the risk period 
could theoretically be reduced close to zero. However, this might be unnecessarily 
laborious. 
 
The SET-IMC operators can utilise the method introduced in this thesis at least in three 
ways. Firstly, if the operators wish to minimise the use of risk period during an arrival 
segment, they can use the method to identify risk areas and then possibly to select an 
alternative emergency landing sites for these periods. Secondly, the results of this case 
analysis clearly indicate that by using higher than nominal 3 degree descent in the arrival 
the risk period can be significantly reduced. The risk can also be affected by the speed 
profile. The operators should consider this when planning their SOPs for the SET-IMC 
operations. Thirdly, if the operators wish to extend the total risk period beyond 15 minutes 
for some routes, they need to conduct a safety risk assessment. The results of the analysis 
help to identify the probability of an unsuccessful landing in the approach phase and 
possible means to mitigate the risk if the cumulative risk is too high. 
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 Operators are encouraged to use the results of this thesis when making their risk analysis 
for new routes. It is recommended to examine the different arrival routes at least at the 
operator’s base airport, where a majority of the flights will be destined to. The results are 
suggested to be exploited in development of the contingency procedures and flight crew 
training. The example illustrations of Helsinki Airport arrival routes can be used to identify 
the risk areas and to possibly determine alternative emergency landing sites, if the allowed 
risk period is not desired to be used. The Google maps background already provides an 
excellent starting point for the search of an alternate landing site. 
 
There are a few related factors this study does not account for. To find the answer to these 
questions, further study and test flights would be required. First, it is clear that decreasing 
the risk period improves flight safety considering engine failure cases. But what are the 
effects of flying steeper descents, higher speeds and vertical speeds for total flight safety, 
remains unclear. For example, the risk for unstable approach might increase. However, the 
total effects might be difficult to study and stay under discretion of experts. 
 
Second, the developed method might not be suitable for all environments. It does not take 
high obstacles and terrain around the airport into account. The obstacles could set 
restrictions to glide routes and need to be examined separately. Moreover, some airports 
might have more constrained approach speed and altitude design. Consequently, the 
utilisation of high descent angles and speeds is more limited. On the other hand, the results 
showed that restrictions increase risk period. This emphasises the need to identify risk 
periods and areas. This thesis provides the tools for the analysis. 
 
Third, conditions deviating from the ISA could give differing results. Especially local air 
temperature and pressure variations could have an impact in the risk period length. As 
aircraft altimetry is based on pressure levels assuming ISA temperature lapse rate, cold 
temperatures lead to decreased true altitude, and vice versa for warm temperatures. 
Therefore, the planned descent angle in normal operations is actually slightly shallower in 
colder than ISA temperatures. An approximate correction between the indicated and true 
altitudes is 4 per cent for every 10°C below standard temperature as measured at the 
aerodrome (ICAO, 2006). For example, in −20°C (35°C below ISA) the actual vertical 
path angle for 3 degree indicated angle would be approximately 2.63°. Similarly, for 4 
degrees the actual angle would be 3.51° and for 5 degrees 4.39°. Hence, the temperature 
effect for the risk periods and areas can be interpolated from between the results for 
different angles in this thesis. In actual operations, it would be recommended to use 
corresponding temperature corrections to the descent angles to maintain the desired true 
altitudes. Considering warmer than ISA temperatures the results in this analysis are 
conservative. Another possible atmospheric factor causing differing results is the 
deviations in pressure. At low altitudes, when flying with the correct local pressure setting 
below the transition altitude (5000 feet in Finland), the results are correct. However, a 
standard pressure setting 1013 hPa is used above the transition altitude and this could yield 
in errors between the indicated and true altitudes. When the actual pressure is below the 
standard, the true altitude is approximately 30 ft lower per 1 hPa difference (ICAO, 2006). 
Some flight management systems might be able to automatically take the difference into 
account in the descent path calculation. If not, then the flight crew should make the 
necessary calculations to avoid flying below the desired vertical path. 
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 Fourth, in steep high speed descent also the vertical speed increases. In high vertical speeds 
the pressure change is rapid and could be uncomfortable for the passengers if the aircraft 
pressurisation system is not efficient enough. This and also other possible downsides of 
high vertical speed could be facilitated by altering the desired descent angle during the 
descent. For example in the Pilatus PC-12 NG avionics, a different descent angle can be 
selected between each waypoint when planning the vertical profile. Then, only the 
necessary waypoint legs could be planned with higher profile. 
 
Fifth, flying a steeper descent profile could lead to increased fuel consumption. Flight 
economics has grown in importance and one of the main advantages of SET aircraft is 
generally low fuel consumption. This asset is desired to be sustained. However, the 
increment is probably only marginal and could possibly be disregarded. 
 
Finally, a major part of the arising risk period in approach comes from the final approach 
segment. The speed in this segment is the slowest and thus the exposure time increased. In 
this study, the final approach was completely included in the risk period. The glide target 
point in the final approach after FAF/FAP was 50 feet above the runway threshold. 
However, it might not always be necessary to glide up to the threshold: there are often 
areas suitable for safe emergency landing, such as runway (if the threshold is displaced), 
stopway or clearway below the short final. In these cases, the risk period could be reduced 
from the final segment before the landing. A more detailed study for each runway, taking 
into account the individual characteristics is needed. 
 
The use of FDM data would provide a more realistic picture of the actual arrival routes at 
different airports. The problem is that such data is not yet available. Acquiring the data 
would practically require some of the existing or arising SET-IMC operators to start a 
systematic FDM program. Even in that case, it would take some time to collect enough 
data to be used in analysis. At least the Pilatus PC-12 NG could be equipped with an 
optional light weight data recorder (Pilatus Aircraft, 2016). For the purpose of an 
elementary FDM program, it would be a sufficient data provider. The collection of the data 
is relatively easy and a simple tool for the data processing is already available, provided by 
the Pilatus itself. The same method developed in this thesis could be easily applied also for 
actual FDM data. When the data is available, it should be utilised for further study to re-
examine and possibly validate the results in this thesis. 
 
The issues raised in this chapter would provide excellent topics for follow-up research. It 
would be interesting to see how the actual flight profiles and risk periods correlate with the 
theoretical model. Test flights would also provide valuable information on how realistic 
the simulated vertical and speed profiles are in actual operations considering the 
performance capabilities of the Pilatus PC-12, and whether further risk mitigation could be 
possible. Another theme could be studying and comparing the risk periods at different 
airports and with other SET aircraft. To utilise the method developed in this thesis more 
efficiently and flexibly, automated and more user-friendly software for the risk period 
analysis should be developed. There might be a commercial need for such software in the 
future. Furthermore, current avionic systems do not provide continuous in-flight analysis 
on the gliding capability, taking into account actual and forecasted winds at different 
altitudes. The possibility to develop an integrated indication of emergency landing areas 
within glide distance should be studied. From a pilot’s perspective, this would be an 
excellent feature to reduce the workload in the cockpit. 
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 8 Conclusions 
The objectives of this thesis were to first find the equations needed for the risk period 
analysis and to construct a computation method. The outcome was an Excel spreadsheet 
calculation tool. Input values for the most important variables could be altered for the 
computation. Conservative and fixed values were used in this study and the ISA conditions 
were assumed. 
 
A second target was to construct a simulated flight profile and to calculate theoretical risk 
periods for a case example. The case was an aeroplane-airport combination of Pilatus PC-
12 NG approaching Helsinki Airport. The performance capabilities and limitations of the 
PC-12 were considered in the flight profile simulation. Also, the altitude and speed 
constraints and other characteristics of Helsinki Airport approaches were closely followed. 
A total of 40 standard instrument arrivals were studied. Flying at low altitudes and with 
relatively slow speed increases the risk period substantially and should be thus avoided to 
the extent possible. 
  
Aviation regulations for SET-IMC operations were taken into account in this study. Many 
of the related rules and recommendations indicated a need for this examination. Perhaps 
the most essential rule when interpreting the risk period results is the limitation of 
maximum total risk period duration of 15 minutes per flight. The analysis indicated that in 
some cases the limit could be exceeded in the approach phase alone. The operators should 
pay attention to the relation between the arrival direction and the runway in use, as well as 
to the arrival route altitude limitations. Variation between the risk periods for different 
approaches was considerable. The maximum risk period could be, however, extended if the 
operator conducts a risk assessment for the route in question. 
 
A third aim was to study how much the arising risk period could be affected with different 
flight profiles – by altering a descent angle and approach speed. Furthermore, the impact of 
headwind to the risk period was examined. Steeper descent profile reduced the risk period 
remarkably both in still air conditions and in headwind. Incremental speed decreases the 
risk period but mainly due to decreased exposure time to low altitude flying. The risk area 
also decreases marginally as more excess kinetic energy can be transformed into potential 
energy. Headwind decreases the gliding capability of an aeroplane and might have 
substantial influence to the risk period. However, due to unpredictability and variation of 
wind conditions the wind effect is problematic to reasonably account for in the pre-flight 
planning. It is clear that the operators can significantly affect the risk period arising from 
the approach with their SOPs. From the engine failure safety perspective, a three degree 
descent angle in the arrival segment is not the optimum. Other factors permitting, a higher 
angle is recommended to be used. 
 
A fourth goal was to identify geographical location of the risk areas in the case study. The 
results were visualised on a Google maps satellite image. Also the size of the risk area 
varies significantly depending on the route and possible altitude constraints. In general, the 
risk area located at least on the final and base legs of the approach. In many of the straight 
in approaches the complete approach was within risk area. To conclude, the objectives of 
this thesis were fulfilled and the results provided interesting and detailed information on 
the risk periods in the approach phase of flight. 
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Appendix 3. Risk Period Results 
 
Still Air 
Table A3.1. Total time in approach phase in still air. 
  Total time in approach phase (still air) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 13:27 12:45 13:10 12:34 13:01 12:29 
 INTOR 4B 13:10 12:29 12:53 12:18 12:44 12:12 
 LAKUT 5B 12:22 11:43 12:06 11:31 11:56 11:25 
 LUSEP 1B 18:14 17:31 18:02 17:27 17:56 17:25 
 ROPAM 1B 13:51 13:09 13:34 12:58 13:25 12:53 
 VEPIN 1B 19:20 18:37 19:09 18:34 19:04 18:32 
 MAROM 4B 16:00 15:11 15:45 14:59 15:35 14:53 
 NAPUN 1B 20:35 19:42 20:22 19:35 20:16 19:34 
 PEXEN 4B 16:53 16:02 16:37 15:50 16:28 15:45 
04R DIVAM 1R 13:46 13:03 13:31 12:54 13:24 12:50 
 INTOR 4R 14:54 14:11 14:40 14:03 14:34 14:00 
 LAKUT 5R 13:35 12:52 13:20 12:42 13:12 12:38 
 LUSEP 1R 19:44 19:01 19:36 18:59 19:32 18:58 
 ROPAM 1R 15:04 14:20 14:50 14:12 14:43 14:09 
 VEPIN 1R 20:34 19:51 20:27 19:49 20:22 19:48 
15 DIVAM 1M 21:24 20:42 21:14 20:39 21:08 20:37 
 INTOR 5M 16:12 15:30 15:57 15:22 15:50 15:19 
 LAKUT 5M 11:14 10:38 11:01 10:26 10:49 10:19 
 LUSEP 1M 12:47 12:08 12:30 11:55 12:20 11:49 
 ROPAM 1M 13:17 12:36 12:59 12:25 12:50 12:19 
 VEPIN 1M 15:30 14:49 15:14 14:40 15:08 14:37 
22L DIVAM 2A 21:41 20:58 21:33 20:56 21:28 20:55 
 INTOR 3A 16:07 15:24 15:54 15:17 15:48 15:15 
 LAKUT 3A 16:07 15:23 15:53 15:16 15:48 15:15 
 LUSEP 2A 12:36 11:56 12:22 11:45 12:13 11:39 
 ROPAM 2A 11:14 10:38 11:04 10:28 10:55 10:22 
 VEPIN 2A 13:08 12:26 12:52 12:15 12:44 12:10 
22R DIVAM 2V 22:03 21:16 21:53 21:13 21:47 21:11 
 INTOR 3V 15:48 15:02 15:31 14:51 15:22 14:46 
 LAKUT 3V 16:42 15:52 16:25 15:39 16:15 15:34 
 LUSEP 3V 13:03 12:22 12:57 12:16 12:50 12:09 
 PEXEN 3V 23:05 22:13 22:54 22:09 22:49 22:07 
 ROPAM 2V 11:39 11:01 11:30 10:53 11:21 10:45 
 VEPIN 2V 13:37 12:54 13:22 12:42 13:11 12:35 
33 DIVAM 1W 16:31 15:49 16:16 15:42 16:10 15:40 
 INTOR 4W 09:43 09:11 09:34 09:02 09:26 08:55 
 LAKUT 5W 16:35 15:54 16:21 15:47 16:15 15:45 
 LUSEP 1W 17:21 16:40 17:08 16:34 17:02 16:32 
 ROPAM 1W 08:15 07:47 08:09 07:41 08:04 07:36 
 VEPIN 1W 15:54 15:13 15:39 15:04 15:32 15:02 
Min.  08:15 07:47 08:09 07:41 08:04 07:36 
Max.  23:05 22:13 22:54 22:09 22:49 22:07 
Average  15:35 14:52 15:21 14:44 15:14 14:40 
 
 
Appendix 3. Risk Period Results (2/8) 
 
Table A3.2. Approach risk period in still air. 
  Risk period (still air) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 13:27 12:45 13:10 12:34 05:01 04:37 
 INTOR 4B 06:51 06:23 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 LAKUT 5B 06:48 06:20 05:37 05:13 05:02 04:40 
 LUSEP 1B 06:32 06:07 05:37 05:13 05:02 04:40 
 ROPAM 1B 06:42 06:17 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 VEPIN 1B 06:42 06:17 05:38 05:15 05:02 04:40 
 MAROM 4B 10:42 09:57 09:20 08:47 09:06 08:34 
 NAPUN 1B 09:38 09:04 09:20 08:47 09:06 08:34 
 PEXEN 4B 16:53 16:02 16:37 15:50 12:32 11:50 
04R DIVAM 1R 13:46 13:03 13:31 12:54 06:45 06:15 
 INTOR 4R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
 LAKUT 5R 07:54 07:24 06:49 06:22 06:11 05:47 
 LUSEP 1R 07:42 07:14 06:49 06:22 06:11 05:47 
 ROPAM 1R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
 VEPIN 1R 07:34 07:06 06:50 06:23 06:12 05:47 
15 DIVAM 1M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 INTOR 5M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 LAKUT 5M 11:14 10:38 05:34 05:10 04:40 04:18 
 LUSEP 1M 11:50 10:51 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 ROPAM 1M 06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
 VEPIN 1M 08:19 07:32 05:13 04:51 04:37 04:17 
22L DIVAM 2A 07:15 06:48 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 INTOR 3A 07:15 06:48 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 LAKUT 3A 07:23 06:55 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:28 
 LUSEP 2A 12:36 11:56 06:27 06:01 05:48 05:24 
 ROPAM 2A 07:24 06:56 06:27 06:01 05:51 05:27 
 VEPIN 2A 13:08 12:26 10:33 09:47 06:14 05:45 
22R DIVAM 2V 08:14 07:45 07:47 07:19 07:26 06:58 
 INTOR 3V 08:44 08:12 07:56 07:27 07:27 06:59 
 LAKUT 3V 10:24 09:47 09:29 08:55 09:02 08:30 
 LUSEP 3V 13:03 12:22 12:57 12:16 12:50 12:09 
 PEXEN 3V 10:24 09:47 09:29 08:55 09:02 08:30 
 ROPAM 2V 10:28 09:45 08:11 07:41 07:29 07:01 
 VEPIN 2V 13:37 12:54 13:22 12:42 10:12 09:35 
33 DIVAM 1W 09:07 08:41 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 INTOR 4W 09:43 09:11 07:55 07:23 03:30 03:09 
 LAKUT 5W 06:31 06:06 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 LUSEP 1W 06:31 06:06 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 ROPAM 1W 08:15 07:47 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
 VEPIN 1W 06:33 06:08 05:20 04:59 03:30 03:09 
Min.  06:12 05:48 05:13 04:51 03:30 03:09 
Max.  16:53 16:02 16:37 15:50 12:50 12:09 
Average  09:04 08:31 07:34 07:06 06:09 05:44 
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Table A3.3. Risk period change with different profiles compared to 3 degree speed A profile in still air. 
  Risk period change (still air) [%] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B - −5.2 % −2.2 % −6.6 % −62.7 % −65.6 % 
 INTOR 4B - −6.7 % −17.8 % −23.4 % −26.5 % −31.8 % 
 LAKUT 5B - −6.9 % −17.4 % −23.1 % −25.9 % −31.2 % 
 LUSEP 1B - −6.3 % −14.1 % −20.1 % −23.0 % −28.5 % 
 ROPAM 1B - −6.3 % −15.9 % −21.7 % −24.8 % −30.2 % 
 VEPIN 1B - −6.3 % −15.9 % −21.7 % −24.8 % −30.2 % 
 MAROM 4B - −7.0 % −12.8 % −17.9 % −14.9 % −19.9 % 
 NAPUN 1B - −5.8 % −3.1 % −8.7 % −5.4 % −11.0 % 
 PEXEN 4B - −5.1 % −1.6 % −6.3 % −25.7 % −30.0 % 
04R DIVAM 1R - −5.2 % −1.8 % −6.3 % −50.9 % −54.6 % 
 INTOR 4R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
 LAKUT 5R - −6.3 % −13.7 % −19.4 % −21.6 % −26.7 % 
 LUSEP 1R - −6.2 % −11.5 % −17.4 % −19.6 % −24.9 % 
 ROPAM 1R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
 VEPIN 1R - −6.2 % −9.8 % −15.8 % −18.0 % −23.6 % 
15 DIVAM 1M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 INTOR 5M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 LAKUT 5M - −5.3 % −50.4 % −53.9 % −58.4 % −61.6 % 
 LUSEP 1M - −8.3 % −56.0 % −59.1 % −61.0 % −63.8 % 
 ROPAM 1M - −6.4 % −15.8 % −21.8 % −25.5 % −30.7 % 
 VEPIN 1M - −9.6 % −37.4 % −41.8 % −44.6 % −48.5 % 
22L DIVAM 2A - −6.3 % −11.0 % −17.0 % −19.2 % −24.8 % 
 INTOR 3A - −6.3 % −11.0 % −17.0 % −19.2 % −24.8 % 
 LAKUT 3A - −6.2 % −12.5 % −18.4 % −20.7 % −25.9 % 
 LUSEP 2A - −5.3 % −48.8 % −52.2 % −54.0 % −57.2 % 
 ROPAM 2A - −6.4 % −12.8 % −18.8 % −20.9 % −26.4 % 
 VEPIN 2A - −5.3 % −19.7 % −25.5 % −52.5 % −56.2 % 
22R DIVAM 2V - −6.0 % −5.6 % −11.3 % −9.9 % −15.4 % 
 INTOR 3V - −6.0 % −9.2 % −14.7 % −14.8 % −20.0 % 
 LAKUT 3V - −5.9 % −8.8 % −14.2 % −13.1 % −18.2 % 
 LUSEP 3V - −5.3 % −0.9 % −6.1 % −1.7 % −6.9 % 
 PEXEN 3V - −5.9 % −8.8 % −14.2 % −13.1 % −18.2 % 
 ROPAM 2V - −6.9 % −21.8 % −26.6 % −28.6 % −33.0 % 
 VEPIN 2V - −5.2 % −1.8 % −6.8 % −25.1 % −29.6 % 
33 DIVAM 1W - −4.7 % −41.5 % −45.4 % −61.7 % −65.4 % 
 INTOR 4W - −5.5 % −18.5 % −24.1 % −64.1 % −67.6 % 
 LAKUT 5W - −6.5 % −18.1 % −23.6 % −46.4 % −51.7 % 
 LUSEP 1W - −6.5 % −18.1 % −23.6 % −46.4 % −51.7 % 
 ROPAM 1W - −5.7 % −35.3 % −39.6 % −57.6 % −61.8 % 
 VEPIN 1W - −6.5 % −18.6 % −24.0 % −46.7 % −51.9 % 
Min.  - −9.6 % −56.0 % −59.1 % −64.1 % −67.6 % 
Max.  - −4.7 % −0.9 % −6.1 % −1.7 % −6.9 % 
Average  - −6.2 % −16.8 % −22.1 % −30.9 % −35.7 % 
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Table A3.4. Risk period in percentage of the total time in approach in still air. 
  Risk period [%] of total time in approach (still air) 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 38.6 % 37.0 % 
 INTOR 4B 52.0 % 51.2 % 43.7 % 42.6 % 39.5 % 38.3 % 
 LAKUT 5B 54.9 % 54.0 % 46.4 % 45.4 % 42.2 % 40.9 % 
 LUSEP 1B 35.9 % 34.9 % 31.1 % 30.0 % 28.1 % 26.8 % 
 ROPAM 1B 48.4 % 47.7 % 41.5 % 40.4 % 37.5 % 36.2 % 
 VEPIN 1B 34.7 % 33.7 % 29.4 % 28.2 % 26.4 % 25.2 % 
 MAROM 4B 66.9 % 65.6 % 59.2 % 58.7 % 58.4 % 57.6 % 
 NAPUN 1B 46.7 % 46.0 % 45.8 % 44.9 % 44.9 % 43.8 % 
 PEXEN 4B 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 76.2 % 75.1 % 
04R DIVAM 1R 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 50.4 % 48.7 % 
 INTOR 4R 50.8 % 50.1 % 46.6 % 45.4 % 42.6 % 41.3 % 
 LAKUT 5R 58.1 % 57.5 % 51.1 % 50.1 % 46.9 % 45.8 % 
 LUSEP 1R 39.0 % 38.0 % 34.8 % 33.5 % 31.7 % 30.5 % 
 ROPAM 1R 50.3 % 49.5 % 46.1 % 44.9 % 42.2 % 40.9 % 
 VEPIN 1R 36.8 % 35.8 % 33.4 % 32.2 % 30.5 % 29.2 % 
15 DIVAM 1M 28.9 % 28.0 % 24.5 % 23.5 % 21.8 % 20.8 % 
 INTOR 5M 38.2 % 37.4 % 32.7 % 31.5 % 29.1 % 28.0 % 
 LAKUT 5M 100.0 % 100.0 % 50.6 % 49.6 % 43.1 % 41.8 % 
 LUSEP 1M 92.6 % 89.5 % 41.7 % 40.6 % 37.4 % 36.3 % 
 ROPAM 1M 46.6 % 46.0 % 40.1 % 39.0 % 35.9 % 34.8 % 
 VEPIN 1M 53.7 % 50.8 % 34.2 % 33.0 % 30.5 % 29.4 % 
22L DIVAM 2A 33.4 % 32.4 % 29.9 % 28.7 % 27.3 % 26.1 % 
 INTOR 3A 45.0 % 44.1 % 40.6 % 39.4 % 37.1 % 35.7 % 
 LAKUT 3A 45.8 % 45.0 % 40.6 % 39.4 % 37.0 % 35.9 % 
 LUSEP 2A 100.0 % 100.0 % 52.2 % 51.3 % 47.5 % 46.3 % 
 ROPAM 2A 65.9 % 65.2 % 58.3 % 57.4 % 53.7 % 52.6 % 
 VEPIN 2A 100.0 % 100.0 % 81.9 % 79.8 % 48.9 % 47.3 % 
22R DIVAM 2V 37.4 % 36.4 % 35.6 % 34.5 % 34.1 % 32.9 % 
 INTOR 3V 55.3 % 54.6 % 51.1 % 50.2 % 48.4 % 47.3 % 
 LAKUT 3V 62.2 % 61.6 % 57.7 % 56.9 % 55.6 % 54.7 % 
 LUSEP 3V 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 PEXEN 3V 45.0 % 44.0 % 41.4 % 40.3 % 39.6 % 38.5 % 
 ROPAM 2V 89.9 % 88.5 % 71.2 % 70.6 % 65.9 % 65.3 % 
 VEPIN 2V 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 77.4 % 76.1 % 
33 DIVAM 1W 55.2 % 54.9 % 32.8 % 31.7 % 21.6 % 20.1 % 
 INTOR 4W 100.0 % 100.0 % 82.8 % 81.6 % 37.1 % 35.4 % 
 LAKUT 5W 39.3 % 38.3 % 32.6 % 31.6 % 21.5 % 20.0 % 
 LUSEP 1W 37.6 % 36.6 % 31.1 % 30.1 % 20.5 % 19.1 % 
 ROPAM 1W 100.0 % 100.0 % 65.4 % 64.8 % 43.3 % 41.4 % 
 VEPIN 1W 41.2 % 40.3 % 34.1 % 33.1 % 22.5 % 21.0 % 
Min.  28.9 % 28.0 % 24.5 % 23.5 % 20.5 % 19.1 % 
Max.  100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Average  62.2 % 61.4 % 51.8 % 50.9 % 41.8 % 40.6 % 
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Table A3.5. Total time in approach phase in 20 knot headwind. 
  Total time in approach phase (20 kt headwind) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 15:00 14:07 14:39 13:53 14:29 13:47 
 
INTOR 4B 14:41 13:49 14:21 13:36 14:10 13:29 
 
LAKUT 5B 13:49 13:00 13:31 12:45 13:19 12:38 
 
LUSEP 1B 20:08 19:14 19:54 19:09 19:47 19:07 
 
ROPAM 1B 15:25 14:32 15:05 14:19 14:55 14:14 
 
VEPIN 1B 21:19 20:25 21:07 20:21 21:00 20:19 
 
MAROM 4B 17:49 16:48 17:33 16:34 17:21 16:27 
 
NAPUN 1B 22:46 21:40 22:30 21:31 22:24 21:29 
 
PEXEN 4B 18:48 17:43 18:29 17:29 18:18 17:23 
04R DIVAM 1R 15:22 14:28 15:04 14:17 14:55 14:12 
 
INTOR 4R 16:36 15:40 16:19 15:31 16:11 15:27 
 
LAKUT 5R 15:09 14:15 14:52 14:04 14:43 13:59 
 
LUSEP 1R 21:47 20:52 21:38 20:50 21:32 20:49 
 
ROPAM 1R 16:46 15:50 16:29 15:41 16:21 15:38 
 
VEPIN 1R 22:42 21:46 22:32 21:44 22:27 21:43 
15 DIVAM 1M 23:32 22:40 23:21 22:36 23:14 22:34 
 
INTOR 5M 17:56 17:03 17:38 16:53 17:30 16:51 
 
LAKUT 5M 12:35 11:49 12:19 11:35 12:06 11:26 
 
LUSEP 1M 14:16 13:25 13:55 13:11 13:44 13:04 
 
ROPAM 1M 14:48 13:56 14:27 13:42 14:16 13:36 
 
VEPIN 1M 17:11 16:19 16:52 16:08 16:44 16:05 
22L DIVAM 2A 23:53 22:58 23:43 22:56 23:38 22:55 
 
INTOR 3A 17:53 16:58 17:37 16:50 17:31 16:48 
 
LAKUT 3A 17:53 16:58 17:37 16:49 17:30 16:47 
 
LUSEP 2A 14:07 13:15 13:50 13:02 13:39 12:56 
 
ROPAM 2A 12:38 11:50 12:25 11:39 12:14 11:32 
 
VEPIN 2A 14:40 13:47 14:22 13:35 14:12 13:29 
22R DIVAM 2V 24:17 23:18 24:05 23:14 23:58 23:12 
 
INTOR 3V 17:34 16:35 17:13 16:22 17:03 16:17 
 
LAKUT 3V 18:35 17:31 18:15 17:17 18:03 17:10 
 
LUSEP 3V 14:38 13:46 14:30 13:38 14:22 13:30 
 
PEXEN 3V 25:27 24:21 25:15 24:17 25:08 24:15 
 
ROPAM 2V 13:04 12:16 12:54 12:06 12:43 11:57 
 
VEPIN 2V 15:13 14:19 14:55 14:04 14:42 13:56 
33 DIVAM 1W 18:16 17:24 17:59 17:15 17:52 17:13 
 
INTOR 4W 10:57 10:16 10:47 10:06 10:36 09:56 
 
LAKUT 5W 18:21 17:29 18:04 17:20 17:57 17:18 
 
LUSEP 1W 19:10 18:18 18:55 18:11 18:48 18:08 
 
ROPAM 1W 09:21 08:44 09:14 08:38 09:08 08:31 
 
VEPIN 1W 17:36 16:44 17:18 16:34 17:11 16:32 
Min.   09:21 08:44 09:14 08:38 09:08 08:31 
Max. 
 
25:27 24:21 25:15 24:17 25:08 24:15 
Average 
 
17:18 16:24 17:02 16:15 16:54 16:10 
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Table A3.6. Approach risk period in 20 knot headwind. 
  Risk period (20 kt headwind) [min:s] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 15:00 14:07 14:39 13:53 14:29 13:47 
 INTOR 4B 14:41 13:49 07:39 07:04 06:37 06:05 
 LAKUT 5B 13:49 13:00 07:33 06:59 06:36 06:04 
 LUSEP 1B 07:53 07:19 07:23 06:51 06:36 06:04 
 ROPAM 1B 08:04 07:29 07:33 07:00 06:37 06:05 
 VEPIN 1B 08:55 08:20 07:33 07:00 06:37 06:05 
 MAROM 4B 17:49 16:48 10:50 10:08 10:36 09:54 
 NAPUN 1B 13:11 12:26 10:52 10:09 10:36 09:54 
 PEXEN 4B 18:48 17:43 18:29 17:29 18:18 17:23 
04R DIVAM 1R 15:22 14:28 15:04 14:17 14:55 14:12 
 INTOR 4R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
 LAKUT 5R 15:05 14:04 08:57 08:18 08:04 07:28 
 LUSEP 1R 09:15 08:36 08:44 08:08 08:05 07:28 
 ROPAM 1R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
 VEPIN 1R 09:06 08:29 08:37 08:00 08:11 07:35 
15 DIVAM 1M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 INTOR 5M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 LAKUT 5M 12:35 11:49 12:19 11:35 06:32 06:01 
 LUSEP 1M 14:16 13:25 10:47 09:57 06:05 05:37 
 ROPAM 1M 07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
 VEPIN 1M 17:11 16:19 07:15 06:40 06:05 05:37 
22L DIVAM 2A 08:44 08:07 08:14 07:38 07:45 07:08 
 INTOR 3A 08:44 08:07 08:14 07:38 07:45 07:08 
 LAKUT 3A 09:04 08:26 08:21 07:45 07:38 07:04 
 LUSEP 2A 14:07 13:15 13:50 13:02 07:38 07:04 
 ROPAM 2A 10:03 09:17 08:23 07:47 07:37 07:03 
 VEPIN 2A 14:40 13:47 14:22 13:35 12:24 11:41 
22R DIVAM 2V 11:00 10:20 09:14 08:36 08:50 08:13 
 INTOR 3V 12:13 11:19 09:40 08:59 08:59 08:22 
 LAKUT 3V 18:35 17:31 11:27 10:42 10:44 10:01 
 LUSEP 3V 14:38 13:46 14:30 13:38 14:22 13:30 
 PEXEN 3V 17:14 16:22 11:27 10:42 10:44 10:01 
 ROPAM 2V 13:04 12:16 10:41 09:56 09:17 08:38 
 VEPIN 2V 15:13 14:19 14:55 14:04 14:42 13:56 
33 DIVAM 1W 18:16 17:24 07:19 06:46 06:13 05:44 
 INTOR 4W 10:57 10:16 10:47 10:06 08:56 08:16 
 LAKUT 5W 07:51 07:17 07:17 06:45 06:13 05:44 
 LUSEP 1W 07:51 07:17 07:17 06:45 06:13 05:44 
 ROPAM 1W 09:21 08:44 08:21 07:25 06:13 05:44 
 VEPIN 1W 14:45 13:47 07:18 06:46 06:13 05:44 
Min.  07:29 06:57 06:58 06:27 06:05 05:37 
Max.  18:48 17:43 18:29 17:29 18:18 17:23 
Average  12:12 11:26 09:51 09:11 08:42 08:06 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Risk Period Results (7/8) 
 
Table A3.7. Risk period change with different profiles compared to 3 degree speed A profile in 20 knot headwind. 
  Risk period change (20 kt headwind) [%] 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B - −5.9 % −2.3 % −7.4 % −3.5 % −8.0 % 
 INTOR 4B - −5.9 % −47.9 % −51.8 % −55.0 % −58.5 % 
 LAKUT 5B - −6.0 % −45.3 % −49.4 % −52.2 % −56.1 % 
 LUSEP 1B - −7.2 % −6.5 % −13.1 % −16.4 % −23.1 % 
 ROPAM 1B - −7.1 % −6.3 % −13.2 % −18.0 % −24.5 % 
 VEPIN 1B - −6.5 % −15.2 % −21.4 % −25.8 % −31.7 % 
 MAROM 4B - −5.8 % −39.2 % −43.1 % −40.5 % −44.5 % 
 NAPUN 1B - −5.6 % −17.5 % −22.9 % −19.5 % −24.9 % 
 PEXEN 4B - −5.7 % −1.7 % −7.0 % −2.7 % −7.5 % 
04R DIVAM 1R - −5.9 % −1.9 % −7.1 % −2.9 % −7.6 % 
 INTOR 4R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
 LAKUT 5R - −6.7 % −40.6 % −44.9 % −46.5 % −50.4 % 
 LUSEP 1R - −7.0 % −5.6 % −12.2 % −12.6 % −19.2 % 
 ROPAM 1R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
 VEPIN 1R - −6.9 % −5.3 % −12.1 % −10.2 % −16.7 % 
15 DIVAM 1M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 INTOR 5M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 LAKUT 5M - −6.1 % −2.1 % −8.0 % −48.1 % −52.2 % 
 LUSEP 1M - −5.9 % −24.4 % −30.2 % −57.3 % −60.7 % 
 ROPAM 1M - −7.3 % −6.9 % −13.8 % −18.7 % −25.1 % 
 VEPIN 1M - −5.1 % −57.8 % −61.3 % −64.6 % −67.3 % 
22L DIVAM 2A - −7.1 % −5.8 % −12.6 % −11.3 % −18.4 % 
 INTOR 3A - −7.1 % −5.8 % −12.6 % −11.3 % −18.4 % 
 LAKUT 3A - −7.0 % −7.9 % −14.5 % −15.9 % −22.1 % 
 LUSEP 2A - −6.1 % −2.0 % −7.6 % −46.0 % −50.0 % 
 ROPAM 2A - −7.6 % −16.6 % −22.6 % −24.2 % −29.8 % 
 VEPIN 2A - −6.0 % −2.0 % −7.4 % −15.4 % −20.3 % 
22R DIVAM 2V - −6.0 % −16.0 % −21.7 % −19.7 % −25.3 % 
 INTOR 3V - −7.4 % −20.9 % −26.4 % −26.4 % −31.5 % 
 LAKUT 3V - −5.7 % −38.4 % −42.5 % −42.2 % −46.1 % 
 LUSEP 3V - −6.0 % −0.9 % −6.9 % −1.8 % −7.7 % 
 PEXEN 3V - −5.1 % −33.6 % −38.0 % −37.7 % −41.8 % 
 ROPAM 2V - −6.1 % −18.2 % −23.9 % −29.0 % −34.0 % 
 VEPIN 2V - −5.9 % −1.9 % −7.6 % −3.3 % −8.4 % 
33 DIVAM 1W - −4.8 % −59.9 % −62.9 % −66.0 % −68.6 % 
 INTOR 4W - −6.4 % −1.6 % −7.9 % −18.5 % −24.5 % 
 LAKUT 5W - −7.2 % −7.1 % −13.9 % −20.8 % −26.9 % 
 LUSEP 1W - −7.2 % −7.1 % −13.9 % −20.8 % −26.9 % 
 ROPAM 1W - −6.6 % −10.7 % −20.7 % −33.5 % −38.7 % 
 VEPIN 1W - −6.5 % −50.5 % −54.1 % −57.9 % −61.1 % 
Min.  - −7.6 % −59.9 % −62.9 % −66.0 % −68.6 % 
Max.  - −4.8 % −0.9 % −6.9 % −1.8 % −7.5 % 
Average  - −6.4 % −16.4 % −22.2 % −26.4 % −31.6 % 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. Risk Period Results (8/8) 
 
Table A3.8. Risk period in percentage of the total time in approach in 20 knot headwind. 
  Risk period [%] of total time in approach (20 kt headwind) 
Runway STAR 3 degree profile 4 degree profile 5 degree profile 
  
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
Speed 
profile A 
Speed 
profile B 
04L DIVAM 1B 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 INTOR 4B 100.0 % 100.0 % 53.3 % 52.0 % 46.7 % 45.1 % 
 LAKUT 5B 100.0 % 100.0 % 55.9 % 54.8 % 49.6 % 48.0 % 
 LUSEP 1B 39.2 % 38.1 % 37.1 % 35.8 % 33.3 % 31.8 % 
 ROPAM 1B 52.3 % 51.5 % 50.1 % 48.9 % 44.3 % 42.8 % 
 VEPIN 1B 41.8 % 40.8 % 35.8 % 34.4 % 31.5 % 30.0 % 
 MAROM 4B 100.0 % 100.0 % 61.8 % 61.2 % 61.1 % 60.2 % 
 NAPUN 1B 57.9 % 57.4 % 48.3 % 47.2 % 47.4 % 46.1 % 
 PEXEN 4B 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
04R DIVAM 1R 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 INTOR 4R 54.8 % 54.1 % 52.8 % 51.6 % 50.5 % 49.1 % 
 LAKUT 5R 99.5 % 98.7 % 60.3 % 59.1 % 54.8 % 53.4 % 
 LUSEP 1R 42.5 % 41.2 % 40.4 % 39.0 % 37.5 % 35.9 % 
 ROPAM 1R 54.3 % 53.5 % 52.3 % 51.0 % 50.0 % 48.5 % 
 VEPIN 1R 40.1 % 38.9 % 38.2 % 36.8 % 36.4 % 34.9 % 
15 DIVAM 1M 31.8 % 30.6 % 29.9 % 28.6 % 26.2 % 24.9 % 
 INTOR 5M 41.8 % 40.7 % 39.6 % 38.2 % 34.8 % 33.3 % 
 LAKUT 5M 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 54.0 % 52.6 % 
 LUSEP 1M 100.0 % 100.0 % 77.5 % 75.5 % 44.3 % 43.0 % 
 ROPAM 1M 50.6 % 49.8 % 48.3 % 47.1 % 42.6 % 41.3 % 
 VEPIN 1M 100.0 % 100.0 % 43.0 % 41.3 % 36.3 % 34.9 % 
22L DIVAM 2A 36.6 % 35.3 % 34.7 % 33.3 % 32.8 % 31.1 % 
 INTOR 3A 48.8 % 47.8 % 46.7 % 45.4 % 44.3 % 42.4 % 
 LAKUT 3A 50.7 % 49.7 % 47.4 % 46.1 % 43.6 % 42.1 % 
 LUSEP 2A 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 55.9 % 54.6 % 
 ROPAM 2A 79.6 % 78.5 % 67.5 % 66.8 % 62.2 % 61.2 % 
 VEPIN 2A 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 87.4 % 86.7 % 
22R DIVAM 2V 45.3 % 44.3 % 38.4 % 37.0 % 36.8 % 35.4 % 
 INTOR 3V 69.5 % 68.2 % 56.1 % 54.9 % 52.7 % 51.4 % 
 LAKUT 3V 100.0 % 100.0 % 62.8 % 61.9 % 59.4 % 58.4 % 
 LUSEP 3V 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
 PEXEN 3V 67.7 % 67.2 % 45.4 % 44.0 % 42.7 % 41.4 % 
 ROPAM 2V 100.0 % 100.0 % 82.9 % 82.1 % 73.0 % 72.2 % 
 VEPIN 2V 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
33 DIVAM 1W 100.0 % 100.0 % 40.7 % 39.2 % 34.8 % 33.3 % 
 INTOR 4W 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 84.2 % 83.2 % 
 LAKUT 5W 42.7 % 41.7 % 40.3 % 38.9 % 34.6 % 33.1 % 
 LUSEP 1W 40.9 % 39.8 % 38.5 % 37.1 % 33.1 % 31.6 % 
 ROPAM 1W 100.0 % 100.0 % 90.3 % 86.0 % 68.1 % 67.3 % 
 VEPIN 1W 83.8 % 82.4 % 42.2 % 40.8 % 36.2 % 34.7 % 
Min.  31.8 % 30.6 % 29.9 % 28.6 % 26.2 % 24.9 % 
Max.  100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Average  74.3 % 73.8 % 61.5 % 60.4 % 54.1 % 52.9 % 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (1/21) 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas 
 
Runway 04L 
 
 
Figure A4.1. Runway 04L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 1/2. 
 
Figure A4.2. Runway 04L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 1/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (2/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.3. Runway 04L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 1/2. 
 
Figure A4.4. Runway 04L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 2/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (3/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.5. Runway 04L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 2/2. 
 
Figure A4.6. Runway 04L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air, 2/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (4/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.7. Runway 04L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 1/2. 
 
Figure A4.8. Runway 04L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 1/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (5/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.9. Runway 04L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 1/2. 
 
Figure A4.10. Runway 04L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 2/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (6/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.11. Runway 04L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 2/2. 
 
Figure A4.12. Runway 04L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind, 2/2. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (7/21) 
 
Runway 04R 
 
 
Figure A4.13. Runway 04R risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.14. Runway 04R risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (8/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.15. Runway 04R risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.16. Runway 04R risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (9/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.17. Runway 04R risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure A4.18. Runway 04R risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (10/21) 
 
Runway 15 
 
 
Figure A4.19. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.20. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (11/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.21. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.22. Runway 15 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (12/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.23. Runway 15 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure A4.24. Runway 15 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (13/21) 
 
Runway 22L 
 
 
Figure A4.25. Runway 22L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.26. Runway 22L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (14/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.27. Runway 22L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.28. Runway 22L risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (15/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.29. Runway 22L risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure A4.30. Runway 22L risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (16/21) 
 
Runway 22R 
 
 
Figure A4.31. Runway 22R risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.32. Runway 22R risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (17/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.33. Runway 22R risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.34. Runway 22R risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (18/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.35. Runway 22R risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure A4.36. Runway 22R risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (19/21) 
 
Runway 33 
 
 
Figure A4.37. Runway 33 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.38. Runway 33 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (20/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.39. Runway 33 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, still air. 
 
Figure A4.40. Runway 33 risk areas, 3 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
Appendix 4. Result Visualisations – Risk Areas (21/21) 
 
 
Figure A4.41. Runway 33 risk areas, 4 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
Figure A4.42. Runway 33 risk areas, 5 degree descent profile, speed profile A, 20 kt headwind. 
 
 
